Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 82 of 174
Book II · Chapter 9 · §§ 5–9
Latin
p. 166Quod idem etiam probatur, quia non decet mentes instrumenta esse eius motoris qui mente careat. Omnes autem mentes Dei sunt instrumenta. Ad idem illud quoque confert, quod cum in Deo idem sit essentia et operatio, consequens est ut eius operatio ex earum genere sit quae in externam materiam non transeunt, sed in agente manent tamquam ipsius perfectiones potius quam materiae. Talis est cognitio et appetitio.
In Deo igitur saltem cognitio est, intelligentia scilicet, vel eminentior quam ipsa intelligentia.
Et quoniam intelligentia Dei prima intelligentia est, et quicquid est in aliquo genere primum purum est et solum et in se ipso, ideo idem est ibi penitus esse et intelligere, ne si aliud esse sit, aliud intelligere, cogamur intelligentiam illam in alio, id est in essentia, collocare. Item si prima ibi intelligentia est, est utique perfectissima.
Talis est plane quae illi obiecto quod est per ipsam comprehendendum quam proxima est. Sic enim certa est prorsus, nullius indiga, atque plenissima. Illa vero intelligentia rei cognoscendae est proxima, per quam res intelligens intelligit semet ipsam. Propria igitur intelligentia Dei est ut se ipsum intelligat, praesertim quia si ab externo quodam obiecto intelligentia Dei perficeretur, ab eodem perficeretur essentia Dei, quae eadem est cum illa; fieretque Deus ab alio.
Quis dixerit divinam mentem externa sequi ut intelligat, cum externa divinam mentem sequi cogantur ut sint?
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 167This is also proved by the fact that it would be unfitting for minds to be instruments of a mover without mind. Yet all minds are instruments of God. The same point is also supported by this: since essence and operation are identical in God, it follows that his operation belongs to the class of operations which do not pass over into external matter, but remain in the agent as perfections of the agent rather than of matter. Cognition and appetite are such operations.
Thus in God at least there is cognition: intelligence, that is, or something higher than intelligence itself.
And because God’s intelligence is the first intelligence, and whatever is first in any genus is pure, alone, and in itself, being and understanding are there wholly the same. Otherwise, if being were one thing and understanding another, we would be compelled to place that intelligence in something else, namely in essence. Again, if the first intelligence is there, it is surely the most perfect.
Such an intelligence is plainly the one nearest to the object to be comprehended through it. It is thus wholly certain, in need of nothing, and most complete. But the intelligence nearest to the thing to be known is that through which an intelligent thing understands itself. The proper intelligence of God, therefore, is that he understand himself; especially because, if God’s intelligence were perfected by some external object, God’s essence—which is the same as that intelligence—would be perfected by the same object, and God would come to be from another.
Who would say that the divine mind follows external things in order to understand, when external things are compelled to follow the divine mind in order to be?
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.9.5–II.9.9
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.