Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 81 of 174
Book II · Chapter 9 · §§ 1–4
Latin
p. 164Deus intelligit se ipsum primo ac etiam singula.
Intellectus numquam fieret rei intelligendae capax, nisi esset aliqua sibi cum re ipsa cognatio. Quapropter, cum sit inter intellectum et rem intelligendam cognatio, qua via aliquid proficit ad hoc ut intelligibile fiat, eadem proficit ut sit intellectus. Sed discessus a materia unica via est per quam res quaeque eum adipiscitur terminum ut intelligenda intelligibilisque sit, id est, talis ut proprie possit intelligi, quia tunc proprie res intelliguntur quando seorsum a materia ac materiae conditionibus cogitantur. Itaque per eundem discessum ad id pervenire quis potest ut sit intellectus. Sane si separari a materia causa est ut forma quaelibet unum quiddam fiat cum intellectu, multo prius magisque semotum esse a materia causa est ut res aliqua intellectus sit et intelligens.
Quia vero nullus a materia remotior est quam Deus, exactius nullus intelligit. Rursus intelligentia appetibilis est tamquam bonum; per eam enim res quaeque se ipsa frui potest, ac ceteris omnibus.
Primo autem bono, id est Deo, nihil deest boni. Adde quod causa omnis per formam agit.
Et quanto amplior causa est, tanto per ampliorem agit formam. Amplissima causa Deus est; amplissima igitur forma est in Deo. Nusquam vero est forma amplior quam in mente. Deus igitur habet mentem.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 165God understands himself first, and also each particular thing.
The intellect could never become capable of a thing to be understood unless it had some kinship with the thing itself. Since, therefore, there is a kinship between intellect and the thing to be understood, by the same path through which something advances toward becoming intelligible it advances toward becoming intellect. But separation from matter is the sole path by which each thing reaches the point of being understandable and intelligible—that is, of being such that it can properly be understood; for things are properly understood when they are conceived apart from matter and the conditions of matter. By the same separation, therefore, something can reach the point of being intellect. Indeed, if separation from matter is the cause by which any form becomes one with the intellect, then still more, and more fundamentally, remoteness from matter is the cause by which something is intellect and intelligent.
Since no one is more removed from matter than God, no one understands more exactly. Again, intelligence is desirable as a good, for through it each thing can enjoy both itself and all other things.
But the first Good, that is God, lacks no good. Add that every cause acts through form.
And the greater the scope of a cause, the more extensive the form through which it acts. God is the most comprehensive cause; therefore the most comprehensive form is in God. Yet nowhere is form more comprehensive than in mind. Therefore God has mind.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.9.1–II.9.4
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.