Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 79 of 174
Book II · Chapter 8 · §§ 1–4
Latin
p. 160Deus agit per suum esse quicquid agit.
Sed neque Epicureus Deum dicat, si multa egerit, sollicitari consilio et opere onerari; meminisse oportet Deum, quia per suum esse solum opus suum potest efficere, consilio et electione non indigere.
Nam si ipsum esse divinum non tanti esset ut valeret per se operari, sed consilio quodam quod ab ipso esse sit differens indigeret, nullius certe rei esse per se quicquam operaretur. Nunc autem corporum qualitates agunt in se invicem absque consilio. Nunquid sol illuminat mundum, et ignis calefacit, et anima alit corpus per electionem potius quam per esse? Proinde illa etiam quae per electionem agunt aliquid etiam per esse suum faciunt naturale, id est, per virtutem ipsi esse insitam naturaliter.
Quippe hominis anima licet multa per electionem agat, corpori tamen sine electione ipso esse dat vitam. Nonne etiam electio ipsa quodammodo opus est animi? Atque huiusmodi opus ab ipso esse animae est absque praecedente electione, ne similiter illa praecedens electio electione alia indigeat praecedente, et alia rursus alia. Sic opus quodlibet animi requireret ante se electiones innumeras priusquam inciperet fieri, neque inciperet umquam fieri, quoniam infinita transire non licet.
Colligamus ita. Si actio quae per esse ipsum naturale peragitur inest omnibus, non autem actio illa quae fit eligendo, quia corpora nihil eligunt, atque etiam actionem ipsam electionis consiliique antecedit semper actio quae fit per esse ipsum atque naturam, constat plane actionem hanc quae ipso esse fit causae universali et primae, qui Deus est, convenire, ut prima communisque actio primi sit et communis agentis. Actio quae fit per esse fit absque cura atque labore. Sic sol uno actu facillime illuminat quodammodo infinita et gignit illuminando. Ignis plurima facillime calefacit.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 161Whatever God does, he does through his own being.
But no Epicurean should say that, if God does many things, he is troubled by deliberation and burdened by labor. We must remember that, because God can accomplish his work through his being alone, he needs neither deliberation nor choice.
For if divine being itself were not of such power that it could act through itself, but needed some deliberation different from being itself, the being of no thing would ever accomplish anything through itself. Yet bodily qualities act upon one another without deliberation. Do the sun illuminate the world, fire give heat, and soul nourish the body by choice rather than by their being? Thus even those things that act through choice also do something natural through their being, that is, through a power naturally implanted in that being.
For although the human soul performs many things by choice, it nevertheless gives life to the body without choice, through its very being. Is not choice itself also in some manner a work of the soul? Yet a work of this kind arises from the soul’s very being without a preceding choice; otherwise that preceding choice would in turn require another choice before it, and that one yet another. Every work of the soul would thus require innumerable choices before it could begin to be done, and it would never begin, since one cannot traverse an infinite series.
Let us reason as follows. Action performed through natural being itself is present in all things, whereas action performed by choosing is not, since bodies choose nothing; moreover, action through being itself and nature always precedes the very action of choice and deliberation. It is therefore altogether evident that this action, which takes place through being itself, belongs to the universal and first cause, which is God, so that the first and common action belongs to the first and common agent. Action through being occurs without care or labor. Thus by a single act the sun very easily illuminates things in a certain sense infinite, and begets by illuminating. Fire very easily heats many things.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.8.1–II.8.4
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.