Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 57 of 174
Book II · Chapter 3 · §§ 1–3
Latin
p. 116Non sunt dii plures alius super alium sine fine.
Ceterum concedet forsitan nobis aliquis esse quidem Deum super angelum, et unum esse Deum, ita ut non sint dii plures aequales invicem, esse tamen Deum alium super alium sine fine. Hoc licet arbitremur ex superioribus confutatum, aliis tamen rationibus clarius refellemus. Si dii sic innumerabiles sint, erunt rerum causae infinitae, sed gradatim innumere superantes, siquidem ipsi dii rerum causae sunt et innumere alii aliis praeponuntur. Si ita, erunt quoque effectus in mundo innumerabiles.
Quaelibet enim causa suum aliquem in rerum ordine producit effectum. Atque sicut causae se inter se superant, ita se superant et effectus. Igitur infiniti erunt effectus in descendendo et innumere deficient sub se deinceps, si causae sint infinitae, innumere se superantes. Et cum superior causa semper longius virtutem suam in producendis effectibus iaciat quam inferior, in infinitum erit iactus effectuum, si causarum fuerit infinitus ascensus. Hoc quam absurdum sit quis non viderit? Primo quidem, si non sit in rebus primum aliquid, non erunt sequentia ulla. Cuncta enim trahuntur a primo.
Quod quidem si nusquam exstet, non erit unde effluxus rerum aliunde fluentium umquam exordiatur. Deinde videmus in rebus alias esse aliis perfectiores, perfectionisque virtutem ascendendo crescere, decrescere descendendo. Quo fit ut vis naturalis rerum descendendo sensim debilitetur. Unde cogitur alicubi omnino deficere, postquam minuitur paulatim. Ideoque non potest res alia esse sine fine sub alia. Itaque non erunt effectus innumeri. Non erunt igitur innumerae causae. Siquidem eo ipso quod ascendendo crescit perfectio, perspicue constat illam quandoque ad summum venturam fore.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 117There are not several gods, one above another without end.
Yet perhaps someone will grant us that there is indeed a God above the angel, and that God is one in the sense that there are not several gods equal to one another, but will nevertheless maintain that there is one God above another without end. Although we judge this refuted by what has gone before, we shall disprove it more clearly by other arguments. If the gods are thus innumerable, the causes of things will be infinite, surpassing one another by numberless degrees, since the gods themselves are causes of things and, without number, some are set above others. If so, the effects in the world will also be innumerable.
For every cause produces some effect of its own within the order of things. And just as the causes surpass one another, so too do the effects. The effects will therefore be infinite in the downward direction, falling away beneath one another in numberless succession, if the causes are infinite and surpass one another by numberless degrees. And since a higher cause always casts its power farther in producing effects than a lower one, the projection of effects will extend to infinity if the ascent of causes is infinite. Who does not see how absurd this is? First, if there is no first thing among things, there will be no subsequent things at all; for all are drawn from the first.
If that first thing exists nowhere, there will be no source from which the outflow of things that flow from elsewhere can ever take its beginning. Next, we see that among things some are more perfect than others, and that the power of perfection increases in ascending and decreases in descending. Hence the natural power of things is gradually weakened in the descent. It must therefore fail altogether somewhere, since it diminishes little by little. Thus one thing cannot lie below another without end. The effects will consequently not be innumerable, and therefore neither will the causes. For the very fact that perfection increases in the ascent plainly shows that it must at some point reach the highest.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.3.1–II.3.3
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.