Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

19If by natural instinct the Good is judged more precious than mind, it is also judged more eminent. Hence the mere act of understanding does not suffice for us unless we both understand well and understand the Good. For we often reject knowledge for a time if we suspect that it will prove bad and troublesome for us; but we can never reject the Good itself. We often prefer pleasure even to the contemplation of things, yet we can never prefer anything to the Good itself precisely insofar as it is good. Nothing is more necessary than the prompting of the Good, since no one can fail to will the Good itself. Nothing is more voluntary than the prompting of the Good. For we will all things for the sake of the Good—indeed, we will the Good everywhere in all things—so willingly and so joyfully that we wish, in addition, to be unable not to will it. Since, therefore, supreme necessity and supreme freedom coincide in the Good, and the dominion of the Good is at once supremely necessary and supremely voluntary for its subjects, it is clear that all things draw their origin from it as from a father, and that all things aspire toward it as toward their homeland.