Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 45 of 174
Book I · Chapter 6 · §§ 16–18
Latin
p. 92Accedunt ad haec huiusmodi rationes. Omnia bonum appetunt. Mentem vero non omnia; non enim assequi mentem et sapientiam omnia possunt. Ideoque multa sunt quae eam non appetunt, ne frustra appetant. Si omnia appetendo convertuntur ad bonum, non ad mentem omnia, et quo conversio rerum est, illinc est et profectio, omnia a bono procedunt, non a mente. Quare bonum potius quam mens est causa prima rerum. Rursus quae mentem habent nondum tamen cessant, sed adhuc bonum quaerunt. Mentis enim proprium est nixus quidam ad intelligendum. Aut post hunc nixum deterius se mens habet, aut melius, aut aeque.
Non deterius, quia operatio ipsa perfectio quaedam est, et ad deterius nihil nisi aut vi aut inscitia labitur, quorum neutrum in ipsam cadit mentem puram et liberam. Non aeque. Frustra enim nititur quod nihil proficit, et nihil ad id quod habet adnititur. Ergo ut melius se habeat conatur. Non igitur ipsum bonum est. Nihil enim bono melius. Sic mens intelligendo haurit bonitatem. Aliunde autem haurit. Si enim in se haberet, non esset nixu opus ut operando proficeret. Illud unde haurit bonitatem ipsum bonum est, quod et super eam exstat, cum in eam perfectionis suae liquorem infundat. Quinetiam sapientiam mentemque solo petimus rationis impulsu.
Bonum vero etiam ante omne rationis incitamentum. Omnisque noster appetitus semper est ad bonum, non omnis semper ad mentem, et intelligentiam ratione boni appetimus, non converso. Pluris ergo natura facit bonum quam mentem, cum et prius et saepius et potius trahat ad bonum. Unde nonnulli satis in philosophia habere se putant, si sapientiam videantur habere, et si non habeant. Non tamen satis in vita, nisi revera id possideant quod sibi praecipue iudicant esse bonum.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book I
p. 93To these may be added arguments of the following kind. All things desire the good, but not all things desire mind, for not all things can attain mind and wisdom. Hence many things do not desire mind, lest they desire in vain. If all things in desiring turn toward the good, whereas not all turn toward mind, and if the procession of things comes from the very point toward which their conversion is directed, then all things proceed from the good, not from mind. The good rather than mind is therefore the first cause of things. Again, things that possess mind do not yet come to rest, but continue to seek the good; for the proper activity of mind is a certain striving to understand. After this striving, mind must fare either worse, better, or equally well.
It does not fare worse, because operation is itself a certain perfection, and nothing falls into a worse condition except through force or ignorance, neither of which can befall the pure and free mind. Nor does it fare equally well. What makes no progress strives in vain, and nothing strives for what it already possesses. Mind therefore strives to become better. It is not, then, the Good itself, for nothing is better than the Good. Thus mind draws goodness through understanding, but it draws it from elsewhere. If it possessed goodness within itself, it would have no need of striving in order to advance through its activity. That from which it draws goodness is the Good itself, which also stands above mind, since it pours the liquor of its perfection into mind. Moreover, we seek wisdom and mind only under the impulse of reason.
The Good, however, we seek even before any prompting of reason. Every appetite of ours is always directed toward the Good, though not every appetite is always directed toward mind; and we desire intelligence because it is good, not the Good because it is intelligent. Nature therefore values the Good more highly than mind, since it draws us toward the Good earlier, more often, and in preference to mind. Hence some think themselves sufficiently endowed in philosophy if they seem to possess wisdom, even if they do not possess it. They do not, however, think themselves sufficiently endowed in life unless they truly possess what they especially judge to be good for themselves.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book I · I.6.16–I.6.18
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.