Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

15For, as we shall show elsewhere, rational souls are situated between eternity and time. The excellence of eternity seems to demand that there be, in some sense, more species and perfections within it than there are in time. I pass over what we shall demonstrate elsewhere: that the interval between souls and the first principle is infinite, while the space between souls and matter is finite. No one, therefore, should find it surprising that there can be a great many more ranks of angels above souls than ranks of forms beneath them.

16Moreover, whenever one thing is made from two, and the less perfect of the two is found somewhere to remain by itself apart from the other, all the more can the other, more perfect and less needy, exist somewhere without the first. Now a single living creature is made from an intellectual substance—that is, a rational soul—and a body. We see many bodies existing and living without an intellect of this kind. What, then, prevents there being very many minds not united to bodies? Such minds will indeed stand above souls that are united to bodies. Minds joined to bodies, insofar as they are such, do not by themselves complete the species of a living creature, but are parts of a composite species; and, for the most part, in order to understand, they look toward sensible things. They are therefore imperfect in a certain sense and act imperfectly. If, then, we must ascend in every kind from imperfect things to the perfect things that are prior by nature, it follows that reason must lead us above conjoined minds to separate minds, which themselves fully complete their own species and, in understanding, look toward things intelligible in themselves.