Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 32 of 174
Book I · Chapter 5 · §§ 11–13
Latin
p. 66Praeterea quicquid secundum partem tale est per illud duntaxat tale est quod tale secundum se totum exsistit, sicut lignum ex parte calidum per ignem calescit qui ex toto calet. Quia quod tale est per naturam suam, puta calidum, sicut totum a natura propria comprehenditur, ita totum ab huiusmodi qualitate. Atque contra, quod per partem est tale non est tale per semetipsum. Tertia vero essentia illa, scilicet anima, non est secundum se tota intelligentia. Habet enim alias quasdam naturas praeter intelligentiam, expertes intelligentiae. Ergo mens in anima pars quidem est animae. Pars quoque est mentis quodammodo, mentis, inquam, altioris, quae tota solaque mens est.
Quippe si anima mentem haberet a semetipsa, in animae substantia ratio propagandae mentis inesset. Unde et tota anima esset mens, et mens quidem tota atque perfecta, et omnis anima mentem haberet, quia in qualibet anima ratio animae reperitur. Et sicut movere corpus, quia per naturam suam animae convenit, animabus singulis inest, ita intelligendi facultas animabus inesset omnibus, etiam bestiarum, si per naturam suam competeret animae.
Ac si super naturam minime efficacem esse efficaciorem aliquam necesse est, et mens quae est in anima neque solo sui actu ullum extra se opus efficit neque efficaci suae animae potentiae imperat, oportet super eam esse mentem suo actu alicuius operis effectricem et efficacis potentiae dominam.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book I
p. 67Moreover, whatever is of a certain character only in part is so solely through that which exists wholly of that character in itself, just as wood that is hot in part is heated by fire, which is hot throughout. For whatever is such through its own nature—hot, for example—is comprehended in its entirety by its own nature and therefore in its entirety by the quality of this kind. Conversely, whatever is such only in part is not such through itself. But that third essence, namely the soul, is not in itself wholly intelligence, for it has certain other natures besides intelligence which are devoid of intelligence. Mind within the soul is therefore a part of the soul. It is also, in a certain sense, a part of mind—I mean of a higher mind, which is mind wholly and alone.
For if the soul possessed mind from itself, the principle for propagating mind would be present in the soul's substance. The whole soul would consequently be mind—a mind whole and perfect—and every soul would possess mind, since the principle of soul is found in every soul. And just as the power to move a body is present in every soul because it belongs to the soul by its own nature, so the faculty of understanding would be present in all souls, even those of beasts, if it belonged to the soul by its own nature.
And if there must be some more efficacious nature above a nature that is least efficacious, while the mind within the soul neither produces any work outside itself by its own act alone nor commands the soul's efficacious power, then above it there must be a mind which by its own act produces some work and is mistress of an efficacious power.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book I · I.5.11–I.5.13
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.