Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

8It moves, I say, for the sake of stability—that is, because of a certain stability in the power that moves it. Unless that power remained in its vigor, no order would be preserved in the motion; indeed, the motion would not continue even briefly. Again, it stands within motion: that is, it perseveres in the same, an equal, or a similar pattern of motion.

9There are also many things which, although moved according to one species of motion, are not moved according to others. Thus they move in part, but in part they rest. Add that, since the prime matter of things is eternal, whatever is changed in its substantial form is nevertheless compelled to persist in the meantime through matter. All the more, then, can—and indeed must—whatever changes in quantity, quality, or place persist meanwhile through its substance. What more need be said? Whatever in no way remains, when it admits a state of rest, is compelled at once to lose its motion altogether. If, then, there is any stability in things, the principle of things cannot be mobile. Therefore what is mobile is not the principle of nature.

10There is, therefore, something above the soul, so that the soul—which by its own nature is equally open to understanding and not understanding, and passes in turn from one to the other—may be determined to understand by the influx of that which is always in act within this kind. Such a thing is always understanding, or always actually intelligible, which amounts to the same.