Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 15 of 174
Book I · Chapter 3 · § 6
Latin
p. 32Verum unde trahit originem? Nunquid a materia? Nequaquam. Quoniam cum materia commune et informe subiectum sit, atque idcirco, quantum in se est, semper et ubique ad omnes formas aeque se habeat, undenam id provenit ut alias et alibi aliis formis ornetur, nisi ab aliquo superiore, quod eam et alibi et alias aliter afficit? Praeterea si materia sibi ipsi datura sit formam, quaerimus utrum ipsa virtute sua prius habeat eam formam quam sibi sit praebitura, aut non habeat. Si non habet, neque concipere quidem potest. Sin habet, non est utique materia prima, sed aliquid ex materia et formae virtute compositum. Atque de hac ipsa virtute similiter inquiremus, nunquid eam habeat a se ipsa an ab alio. Quod si habet ab alio, ab alio quoque habet formam. Sin a se, nunquid hanc similiter habet per aliam virtutem sibi itidem propriam, atque ita in infinitum progrediemur, an potius virtutem illam non per aliam possidet virtutem, sed per essentiam? Si ita est, essentia materiae idem erit ac virtus sive substantia effectiva formarum, et fons erit formarum potius quam subiectum; immo erit forma potius quam materia, et forma omnium praestantissima, forma omnis divisionis impatiens. Neque fluctuabit, ut nunc, labentium varietate formarum, sed per essentiam sempiternam formis erit praedita sempiternis. Ex iis colligitur materiam non habere suapte natura vim ullam formarum procreatricem. Quia formare se ipsum non potest informe subiectum, cum nihil omnino agere queat, siquidem actio a forma provenit, a qua provenit esse. Ac si materia quae subest arti, quamvis forma non careat, non tamen a se ipsa sed ab artis forma ad formam ducitur artificii, certe materia quae naturae subiicitur, cum sit informis, non a se ipsa sed a natura formae ad formam ducitur naturalem.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book I
p. 33But from where does quality draw its origin? From matter, perhaps? By no means. Matter is a common and formless subject and therefore, so far as lies within it, is always and everywhere equally disposed toward every form. From where, then, does it come about that matter is adorned at different times and in different places with different forms, unless from something higher, which fashions it differently in different places and at different times? Moreover, if matter is to give form to itself, we ask whether it already possesses by its own power the form it will bestow upon itself, or whether it does not. If it does not possess the form, it cannot even conceive it. If it does, it is certainly not prime matter but something composed of matter and the power of form. We shall then ask in the same way about this power itself: does matter possess it from itself or from another? If from another, it also has its form from another. If from itself, does it in turn possess this power through another power likewise proper to itself—and so send us onward to infinity—or does it instead possess that power not through another power but through its essence? If the latter, the essence of matter will be identical with a power or substance productive of forms. Matter will be the source of forms rather than their subject; indeed, it will be form rather than matter, the most excellent form of all, a form incapable of any division. Nor will it fluctuate, as it does now, amid a succession of fleeting forms, but through its eternal essence will be endowed with eternal forms. From these considerations it follows that matter has by its own nature no power whatever to generate forms. A formless subject cannot form itself, since it can do nothing at all: action proceeds from form, and from form also proceeds being. Even matter subject to art, though not devoid of form, is led not by itself but by the form of art to the form of the artifact. Surely, then, matter subject to Nature, since it is formless, is led not by itself but by the nature of form to a natural form.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book I · I.3.6
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.