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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IBook IV · Chapter 1 · §§ 25–28

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Latin Page · Branch 146 of 174

Book IV · Chapter 1 · §§ 25–28

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Latin

p. 294

Praeterea si Deus est ipsum esse, non potest esse forma materiae; talis enim forma non est esse ipsum, sed essendi principium.

Et quia Deus est esse, ut ita dixerim, adeo absolutum ut non sit in essentia aliqua, multo minus est in materia. Item cum Deus sit prima efficiens causa, agit sua omnia primo; forma vero materiae non agit primo omnia. Compositum enim primo agit potius quam pars compositi.

Rursus compositi partes in potentia quadam sunt ad ipsum totius actum. In Deo autem nulla est ad ulteriorem actum potentia. Non ergo ex ipso et materia fit animal unum, ut stulte putant Almariani.

Animal quippe rationale ex se ipso movetur. Unde moveri potest et non moveri, atque tum velocius moveri, tum tardius. Quod autem tale est non perseverabit in motione perpetua et aequali, nisi lege alicuius superioris, quod nullo modo mutetur. Deus igitur non est globi alicuius anima, ne ex ipso et globo animal unum conficiatur cogaturque habere supra se ducem.

294

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book IV

p. 295

Moreover, if God is being itself, he cannot be the form of matter; for a form of that kind is not being itself, but a principle of being.

And because God is being—being so absolute, if I may speak in this way, that it is not contained in any essence—much less is he in matter. Again, since God is the first efficient cause, he is the primary agent in all his works; the form of matter, by contrast, does not act primarily in all things. For it is the composite, rather than a part of the composite, that acts primarily.

Again, the parts of a composite are in a certain potency toward the actuality of the whole itself. In God, however, there is no potency toward any further act. Therefore God and matter do not form a single living being, as the Almariani foolishly suppose.

A rational living being, indeed, is moved by itself. Hence it can be moved or not moved, and at one time more swiftly, at another more slowly. But what is of this kind will not persist in a perpetual and uniform motion except by the law of something higher which changes in no way. God, then, is not the soul of any sphere, lest a single living being be composed of him and the sphere and be compelled to have a guide above itself.

295

About This Reading Edition

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.

Discussion Questions

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.