Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 138 of 174
Book III · Chapter 2 · §§ 29–30
Latin
p. 278Visus per suum spiritum spiritali colorum imagini iunctus videt. Iunctus vero materiae nihil cernit, quod patet si quis super aciem oculorum solidum aliquod corpus posuerit. Mens quoque nostra spiritali virtute in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque unita res ipsas intelligit. Similiter, cum essentia tertia, quae quidem spiritalis est, sibi ipsi coniungitur, spiritali modo se ipsam animadvertendo cognoscit atque intelligit. Intelligit etiam divina, quibus spiritali modo haeret quam proxime. Intelligit et corporalia, ad quae declinat etiam per naturam. Cognoscit, inquam, temporaliter discurrendo, cum per operationem sit mobilis. Ex omnibus his colligitur talis quaedam essentiae tertiae definitio, scilicet vita quae corpora per naturam vivificat.
Cognoscit quoque se ipsam et divina et naturalia per discursum. Quicumque vero non viderit eandem esse animae quoque rationalis definitionem, is anima caret rationali. Quapropter anima rationalis in essentia tertia habet sedem, obtinet naturae mediam regionem et omnia connectit in unum.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book III
p. 279Sight sees when, through its own spirit, it is joined to the spiritual image of colors. Joined to matter, however, it discerns nothing, as is evident if someone places a solid body directly upon the eyes. Our mind likewise understands things themselves when by spiritual power it is united to the forms and principles of things within bodies. In the same way, when the third essence—which is spiritual—is joined to itself, it knows and understands itself by apprehending itself in a spiritual manner. It also understands divine things, to which it clings spiritually and most closely. It understands corporeal things as well, toward which it also inclines by nature. It knows, I say, by reasoning discursively through time, since in operation it is mobile. From all this we gather the following definition of the third essence: a life that by nature gives life to bodies.
It also knows itself, divine things, and natural things through discursive reasoning. Whoever fails to see that this is also the definition of rational soul is himself without a rational soul. Rational soul therefore has its seat in the third essence, occupies the middle region of nature, and connects all things into one.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book III · III.2.29–III.2.30
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.