Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 126 of 174
Book III · Chapter 1 · §§ 23–25
Latin
p. 254Idcirco quaecumque stabilia sunt et moventia per aliud retulimus ad Deum per se stabilem et per se moventem. Et quaecumque mobilia sunt ab alio, puta corpora et qualitates, retulimus ad animam mobilem per se ipsam, per se inquam mobilem. Quia si a Deo descendas per angelum, tam Deus quam angelus stare tibi videbitur, et primum quod mobile tibi occurret est anima. Quicquid autem primo tale est in aliquo genere per se est tale, puta quod primo lucidum aut calidum per se lucet et calet. Sic anima, quoniam est primum mobile inter omnia quae sunt mobilia, est utique per se mobilis. Cuius rei signum est quia corpora quae carent anima impulsu solum agitantur externo; quae animam habent sua sponte moventur et in quamlibet loci partem. Et quoniam anima id praestat corporibus ut per se quodammodo in partem quamlibet moveantur, sequitur ut ipsa sit vere et primo mobilis per se ipsam, primumque mobile. Postquam per eius praesentiam apparet in corpore imago aliqua per se mobilis facultatis fitque ibi motus in omnem partem, quod significat animam esse fontem motus, unde libera et universalis effluit agitatio. Per haec solutum arbitror Pythagoricum illud aenigma a Xenocrate usurpatum, scilicet animam esse numerum se moventem: numerum, id est naturam multiplicem; se moventem, id est sua proprietate mutabilem.
Talem vero naturam esse alicubi oportere multa nobis, ut significavimus iam, declarant.
Primum, quod omne quod per aliud tale est reducitur ad aliquid quod per se sit tale. Secundum, quia cum sint multa quae moventur ab alio, si omnia talia sunt, vel in infinitum vagabimur, vel circulo revolvemur eodem, ut idem sit primus motor et ultimus, causa idem atque effectus, neque in rebus ordo sit ullus. Quocirca ad motorem aliquem pervenire compellimur qui iam non moveatur ab alio.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book III
p. 255Therefore we have referred whatever is stable and moves other things through another to God, who is stable through himself and moves through himself. And whatever is moved by another—bodies and qualities, for example—we have referred to soul, which is movable through itself, through itself, I say. For if you descend from God through angel, both God and angel will appear to you to stand, and the first thing you encounter that is movable is soul. Whatever is first of a certain kind is of that kind through itself: what is first luminous or hot, for example, shines and is hot through itself. Thus soul, because it is the first movable thing among all things that are movable, is surely movable through itself. A sign of this is that bodies without soul are stirred only by an external impulse, whereas those that possess soul move of their own accord and in every direction. And because soul enables bodies to move in a certain sense through themselves in any direction, it follows that soul is truly and primarily movable through itself, the first movable thing. Once through its presence an image of a self-moving power appears in body, and motion in every direction arises there, this signifies that soul is the fountain of motion, from which free and universal movement flows. By this I believe I have solved that Pythagorean riddle used by Xenocrates: that soul is a self-moving number—‘number,’ that is, a manifold nature; ‘self-moving,’ that is, mutable by its own property.
Many considerations, as we have already indicated, show us that a nature of this kind must exist somewhere.
First, everything that is of a certain kind through another is brought back to something that is of that kind through itself. Second, since many things are moved by another, if all things were so moved, we should either wander to infinity or revolve in the same circle, so that the first mover and the last would be the same, cause and effect identical, and there would be no order in things. We are therefore compelled to arrive at some mover that is no longer moved by another.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book III · III.1.23–III.1.25
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.