Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 102 of 174
Book II · Chapter 12 · §§ 8–10
Latin
p. 206Ratio quinta. In quibus tria haec, scilicet esse, intelligere, velle, re ipsa inter se discrepant, in iis non est absoluta libertas, quoniam in rebus huiusmodi modus volendi sequitur intelligendi normam, haec essendi conditionem, esse denique sequitur eum qui dedit esse. At in Deo idem est re ipsa esse, intelligere, velle. Quamobrem ita est per voluntatem suam intelligentiae essentiaeque suae compos, ut non modo sicut est et sicut intelligit suapte natura ita quoque velit, verum etiam sicut vult ita intelligat atque exsistat. Ob hanc forsitan rationem Zoroastris sectatores tradunt Deum quodammodo agere semet ipsum.
Quod in hunc ferme modum, quem dicam, Plotinus exposuit: Deus est actus, non alterius, non circa alterum, sed suimet et circa se ipsum. Est enim actus intra se manens.
Quoniam vero actus est propter naturam infiniti boni infinite fecundus, ideo non caret acto, id est genito, acto scilicet infinito. At quoniam et per actum intimum fit aliquid intimum et solus Deus est infinitus, quod inde actum, id est genitum, est intra Deum, est ipsemet Deus. Deus est actus pervigil atque perpetuus, ex se, in se, circa se penitus. Ergo ut agit et vigilat ita prorsus exsistit. Totus nixus divini actus circa se vertitur.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 207Fifth argument. Wherever the three—being, understanding, and willing—differ from one another in reality, there is no absolute freedom. In beings of this kind, the manner of willing follows the rule of understanding; understanding follows the condition of being; and being, finally, follows the one who bestowed it. In God, however, being, understanding, and willing are in reality the same. Through his will he is therefore master of his own intelligence and essence: not only does he will as he is and understands by his own nature, but he also understands and exists as he wills. Perhaps for this reason the followers of Zoroaster teach that God in some manner makes himself.
Plotinus explained it in roughly the following manner, as I shall now relate. God is activity—not the activity of another or activity directed toward another, but his own activity directed toward himself. For he is activity that abides within itself.
Because this activity, by the nature of the infinite Good, is infinitely fruitful, it does not lack its product—that which is acted, that is, begotten—and this product is infinite. Through an inward act something inward comes to be; and since God alone is infinite, what is thus acted or begotten within God is God himself. God is an ever-watchful and perpetual activity, wholly from himself, in himself, and about himself. He therefore exists precisely as he acts and keeps watch. The whole striving of divine activity turns about himself.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.12.8–II.12.10
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.