Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

5God is what he is in such a way that he could not have been otherwise, for he is, so to speak, all being and all power; indeed, he could not have willed otherwise, for he is all goodness. The ability or will to be otherwise would be weakness and folly, destined to fall into what is worse—indeed, into nothingness. Second argument. If the attraction of the good is at once the most necessary and the most voluntary and spontaneous impulse in every being, then in the Good itself supreme natural necessity certainly coincides with supreme freedom of will, as we have proved elsewhere. There natural necessity confirms freedom of will, and freedom consents to necessity, so that God is necessarily free and willing, and willingly necessary.

6Third argument. So long as a thing is in some measure deprived of the good itself, it is displeased with itself and desires something beyond itself. Once it participates in the good, it takes pleasure in itself, wills itself, and is already what it wishes to be. The more fully it attains this, the more it delights in itself and the more fully it is what it wishes itself to be. The Good itself therefore possesses this above all: it wills itself supremely, delights in itself, and is altogether what it wills itself to be.

7Fourth argument. If things become less servile and more their own masters as they draw nearer to God, then God is supremely his own master. He not only wills things in accordance with what he is by his own nature; he is also altogether as he wills to be, makes such things as he wills, and makes them for whatever end he wills. No agent can ever be the free source of its own action or prescribe an end for that action unless it is the source and end of the universe, master of its own activity, and has itself determined the end of that activity. But let us return to our subject.