Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

11Yet as he rests upon himself, he in some manner acts upon—that is, begets—himself; for if he looked elsewhere, he would lose himself. Divine being is therefore an act directed toward itself, whereas an act directed toward another would not be divine being. God wills himself; and in him willing, acting, and even being are altogether the same. Thus, by willing himself, he acts upon or produces himself—indeed, he posits or seals himself in being. From this Plotinus wishes to conclude that God is not as chance happened or necessity compelled, but as he himself watches, acts, and wills. Let God himself judge these claims. For our part, we desire only to affirm everywhere what is worthy of God.

12Such is the proposition advanced above: in God supreme freedom meets supreme necessity. Sixth argument. Divine goodness alone is the absolute object of the divine mind. Any power can equal its object, but it cannot surpass it; yet there is nothing outside God that God cannot surpass. God therefore wills himself by an absolute necessity of will, for all things necessarily will their final end. Divine goodness is God's final end, for whose sake he wills whatever he wills. We must therefore say either that God wills nothing and is devoid of every appetite—which is absurd—or that, if he wills anything, he necessarily wills himself, especially since in God being and willing are the same. In willing himself he wills all other things. As they exist in God they are God himself; as they flow from God they are images of the divine countenance, ordered toward the display and affirmation of divine goodness as their principal end.

13Yet that act of divine will is absolutely necessary insofar as it regards divine goodness; insofar as it regards creatures, however, some call it not absolutely necessary. For although the will necessarily wills the end itself, its willing of the things directed toward that end is of another kind.