Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 95 of 174
Book II · Chapter 11 · §§ 19–23
Latin
p. 192Respectusque huiusmodi quibus multiplicantur ideae non a rebus ipsis efficiuntur, immo ab intellectu divino suam ad res essentiam comparante, neque sunt, ut ita dicam, reales respectus huiusmodi quales illi quibus personae distingui dicuntur, sed potius intellecti. Sub una idea multa et cognoscuntur et fiunt. Nonnulla etiam per ideam aliorum perspiciuntur, utpote per ideam boni atque habitus malum atque privatio, et, ut quidam putant, per ideam formae materia. Proprietates quoque substantiae per ideam substantiae cognoscuntur.
Qualitates vero communes propriis designantur ideis.
Quemadmodum architectus per domus ipsius formam omnia efficit accidentia quae domum a principio comitantur. Sed quae domui iam factae contingunt, puta picturae atque similia, per alias disponuntur ideas. Sed iam diffusius quam proposuimus de ideis hic quasi casu quodam occasionem nacti tractavimus.
Haec autem est, etsi canes quidam aliter latrant, certissima Platonis nostri Platonicorumque sententia. Quod et supra tetigimus et alias latius declarabimus.
Probavimus hactenus primam causam varios effectus suos per multiplicem sapientiae ordinem operari potius quam per nudae simplicisque naturae necessitatem.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 193Relations of this kind, by which the ideas are multiplied, are not produced by the things themselves but by the divine intellect comparing its essence with things. Nor are they, so to speak, real relations like those by which the persons are said to be distinguished, but rather relations of thought. Under one idea many things are both known and made. Some things are also perceived through the ideas of others: evil and privation through the idea of good and of possession, and, as some think, matter through the idea of form. The properties of substance are likewise known through the idea of substance.
Common qualities, however, are assigned their proper ideas.
In the same way, an architect produces through the form of the house itself all the accidental features that accompany it from the beginning; but those that accrue once the house has been made—paintings and the like—are arranged through other ideas. Yet we have now treated the ideas more fully than we intended, having found here an occasion almost by chance.
This, however—even if certain dogs bark otherwise—is the most certain teaching of our Plato and of the Platonists. We have touched on it above and shall explain it elsewhere at greater length.
We have so far proved that the first cause produces its various effects through an order of manifold wisdom rather than through the necessity of a bare and simple nature.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.11.19–II.11.23
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.