Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

14Therefore God understands all the least things, above all because whoever knows all the causes of the least things understands the least things themselves. But God is ignorant of no causes, for he knows himself. He is the cause of all. Thus, knowing the first and highest of causes and the cause of all things, he knows them all—distinctly, I say, and with the utmost clarity. For when he sees himself, who is the cause of the angel, he sees the angel most clearly. When he beholds the angel, through it, if need be, he beholds its works as through their proper cause; through those works in turn he most plainly beholds the works that proceed from them. Thus he grasps the highest, intermediate, and proximate causes of the lowest things, and therefore clearly discerns those things.

15Yet God has no need to look outside himself, into subsequent causes, in order to behold the ultimate effects, since he himself is the first origin of their being and the cause of being for everything that follows. Thus, when he beholds himself, he beholds the entire being of any and every thing—the entire being, I say, plainly and distinctly. For if he knows himself perfectly, he comprehends his whole power, and his power extends through individual things. He therefore knows individual things. Again, when he sees that his essence and goodness are to be communicated to things, he sees in how many ways that goodness of his can be communicated to them. Things arise in nature with as much variety as there are various ways in which the divine essence and goodness are communicated. Thus, through distinct knowledge of his own goodness, he sees the distinct properties of individual things. For no mode of understanding should be lacking from the supreme intelligence. Therefore God possesses intelligence not only of genera and species, as some have maintained, but also of individual things.