Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 75 of 174
Book II · Chapter 7 · §§ 18–21
Latin
p. 152Tamdiu igitur exsistit natura quamdiu Deus servat eam in exsistendo. Praeterea universum hoc opus Dei vel fuit semper vel aliquando incepit esse. Si fuit semper, primum momentum assignari non potest in quo prae ceteris esse a Deo acceperit. Ergo aut in nullo accepit, quod est falsum, aut quolibet momento accipit inde.
Hoc autem nihil aliud est ab eo continue conservari. Si vero esse incepit aliquando, multo magis Deo eget tamquam conservatore, siquidem egeret etiam si poneretur aeternum.
Omnino autem quod alicui secundum naturam suam convenit prius convenit quam quod advenit aliunde. Sed operi secundum se quidem convenit non esse, postquam non accedente causa non fuisset; per causam vero convenit esse. Prius igitur illi ut non sit convenit quam ut sit.
Quapropter prius illi competit ut a causa servetur quam ut a se ipso. Et quia quod naturale est numquam amittitur, semper tale est ut, submota causae virtute, non perseveret in esse, postquam tale fuit ab initio naturaliter ut non prodiret in esse seorsum a causae actione. Causam vero proprie Deum vocamus, qui solus rem quamlibet efficit totam, neque cogitur aut alterius auxilio indigere aut aliunde materiam mutuari.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 153Nature therefore exists only so long as God preserves it in existence. Moreover, this whole work of God either has existed always or began to exist at some time. If it has existed always, no first moment can be assigned at which, rather than at any other, it received being from God. Therefore it either received being at no moment—which is false—or receives it from him at every moment.
But this is nothing other than to be continuously preserved by him. If, however, it began to exist at some time, it needs God all the more as its preserver, since it would need him even if it were posited as eternal.
In general, what belongs to something according to its own nature belongs to it before what comes to it from elsewhere. But considered in itself, it belongs to a work not to exist, since without the intervention of a cause it would not have existed; through its cause, however, it belongs to it to exist. Thus it belongs to it not to be before it belongs to it to be.
Therefore it belongs to a work to be preserved by its cause before it belongs to it to be preserved by itself. And because what is natural is never lost, its condition is always such that, if the cause’s power were removed, it would not persist in being; for from the beginning its natural condition was such that it did not come into being apart from the action of its cause. By ‘cause’ properly we mean God, who alone makes each thing whole and is not compelled either to need another’s assistance or to borrow matter from elsewhere.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.7.18–II.7.21
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.