Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 60 of 174
Book II · Chapter 4 · §§ 1–4
Latin
p. 122Dei virtus est infinita.
Sicut in summa dispersione est imbecillitas infinita, sic in unitate summa infinita potestas. Actus natura sua terminum non includit. Nam subici termino passio est, quae actui est opposita. Actus ergo non patitur terminum nisi quantum subiecto cuidam, ubi aliquid passivae potentiae est, innititur. Actus vero divinus in se ipso subsistit. Virtus ipsa efficax, quatenus virtus est, certum graduum numerum non includit. Quid enim prohibet in alio numero sicut in alio virtutem ipsam, ut virtus est, et cogitari et esse? Quapropter non aliunde graduum accipit terminum quam vel a passiva potentia cui miscetur vel a causa terminante. Divina vero virtus pura est atque summa.
Esse ipsum prout absolute consideratur est immensum, quia et infinitis rebus et innumerabilibus modis communicari potest et cogitari. Igitur, si alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet illud esse finiri vel per ipsius causam vel subiectum. Neutrum contingit Deo. In ipso autem infinito esse ita est infinita virtus, sicut in esse finito finita. In ipso puro nihilo nullus essendi est habitus, sive verus sive imaginarius.
Quis enim sub essendi ratione definiat nihilum? Ergo in ipso esse puro nihil est vel privationis essendi vel potentiae ad non essendum, aut vera aut imaginaria ratione. Igitur neque potest vel cogi vel cogitari non esse, quod ad eius spectat aeternitatem; neque potest deesse illi virtutis gradus ullus qui mente queat effingi.
Alioquin mens, quae Dei effectus est, ultra Deum sese posset extendere, quae quolibet finito graduum numero valet semper ampliorem aliquem cogitare. Immo etiam frustra ad infinitam progressionem esset mens ordinata, nisi inveniretur terminus aliquis infinitus.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 123God's power is infinite.
Just as in supreme dispersion there is infinite weakness, so in supreme unity there is infinite power. Act by its nature includes no limit. For to be subjected to a limit is passivity, which is opposed to act. Act therefore admits a limit only insofar as it rests upon some subject in which there is an element of passive potency. The divine act, however, subsists in itself. Effective power itself, insofar as it is power, includes no fixed number of degrees. What prevents power itself, insofar as it is power, from being both conceived and existing at one number of degrees just as at another? It therefore receives a limit to its degrees only from either the passive potency with which it is mingled or a cause that limits it. But divine power is pure and supreme.
Being itself, considered absolutely, is immeasurable, because it can both be communicated to infinite things and be conceived in innumerable ways. Therefore, if the being of anything is finite, that being must be bounded either by its cause or by its subject. Neither applies to God. In infinite being itself power is infinite, just as in finite being it is finite. In pure nothing itself there is no condition of being, either real or imagined.
For who would define nothing under the aspect of being? Therefore in pure being itself there is nothing either of a privation of being or of a potency not to be, whether in a real or an imagined sense. It can neither be compelled not to be nor be conceived as not being, which pertains to its eternity; nor can it lack any degree of power that the mind is able to fashion.
Otherwise the mind, which is an effect of God, could extend itself beyond God, for with any finite number of degrees it can always conceive some greater number. Indeed, the mind would have been ordered to an infinite progression in vain unless some infinite terminus were to be found.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.4.1–II.4.4
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.