Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 54 of 174
Book II · Chapter 2 · §§ 9–11
Latin
p. 110Omnes vero partes mundi, quamvis diversae, ordine mutuo conciliantur, quia unum constituunt corpus; mutuant invicem naturas et mutantur. Inferiora corpora per superiora moventur, superiora per naturam incorporalem. Neque casu contigit hic ordo, quia idem semper et similis est, quia similem semper retexit telam atque similiter.
Deus igitur mundi unius ordinator est unus. Unus, inquam, prima Platonicorum ratione, quia est unitas. Est etiam unus secunda eorundem ratione, quia est veritas. Summa enim veritas una est. Nam si duae summae veritates esse dicantur, aut una earum habet quicquid habet altera, aut non. Si primum datur, una est, non duae. Si secundum, neutra est summa. Deest enim isti illud veritatis quod in illa est, et illi quod est in ista.
Iterum est unus Deus tertia ratione Platonicorum, quia summa est bonitas. Summa quippe bonitas quicquid boni reperiri usquam potest complectitur. Ergo si duas induxeris bonitates summas, quicquid boni in una est, est et in altera; alioquin neutra esset summa, et secundum boni ipsius naturam unum sunt, non duo. Neque est aliquid aliud illis admixtum praeter bonitatis naturam, quia summae non essent, sed inquinatae. Unum igitur sunt omnino. Denique, si dii duo sunt et uterque potest aeque mundum hunc totum efficere, aut neuter faciet mundum, ac frustra erit in utroque potentia neque usquam mundus erit; aut alter creabit mundum, ac frustra erit in altero potentia generandi; aut generabit uterque totum, atque ita duo erunt mundi aequales omnino invicem et simillimi.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 111But all the parts of the world, though diverse, are reconciled in a mutual order because they constitute one body; they exchange natures with one another and are changed. Lower bodies are moved by higher ones, and the higher by incorporeal nature. Nor did this order come about by chance, because it is always the same and alike, always weaving anew a similar web in a similar way.
Therefore the arranger of the one world is one God. One, I say, by the first reasoning of the Platonists, because he is unity. He is also one by their second reasoning, because he is truth. For supreme truth is one. If there are said to be two supreme truths, either one contains whatever the other contains, or it does not. If the first is granted, there is one truth, not two. If the second, neither is supreme: this one lacks the truth that is in that one, and that one the truth that is in this.
Again, God is one by the third reasoning of the Platonists, because he is supreme goodness. For supreme goodness embraces whatever good can be found anywhere. Therefore, if you introduce two supreme goodnesses, whatever good is in one is also in the other; otherwise neither would be supreme, and according to the very nature of the good they are one, not two. Nor is anything else mixed with them besides the nature of goodness, for then they would not be supreme but polluted. They are therefore wholly one. Finally, if there are two gods and each is equally able to make this whole world, either neither will make the world, so that the power in each will be fruitless and there will be no world anywhere; or one will create the world, so that in the other the power of begetting will be fruitless; or each will generate the whole, and thus there will be two worlds entirely equal and most similar to one another.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.2.9–II.2.11
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.