Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Book II · Chapter 1 · §§ 6–7
Latin
p. 102Quaerimus autem de illo munere quod a superiore descendit principio, utrum sit bonitate donata melius necne. Melius quidem esse nequit. Quicquid enim melius dicitur, maiori bonitatis portione melius appellatur. Tamen absurdum est superioris principii munus non esse melius inferioris causae munere. Accedit quod, cum omnia bonum appetant, si sit aliud principium super ipsum bonum, interrogamus utrum ipsum appetant an non. Si appetere dicantur, sequitur quod aliquid expetunt ultra et plus quam bonum. Si negentur illud appetere, stultum id quidem dictum, quod effectus causam primam, qua servantur, non appetant.
Quinet ipsa bonitas superius principium cupere compelletur, licet absurdum id sit. Nam omnis ratio appetendi ipsa clauditur bonitate. Nihil igitur super bonitatem exstat quod amari queat. Nullum ergo est principium super ipsam. Quamobrem ipsa unitas, veritas, bonitas, quam invenimus super angelum, ex mente Platonis omnium est principium: Deus unus, verusque et bonus.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 103We ask, then, whether that gift which descends from the higher principle is or is not better than the goodness bestowed. It cannot be better: whatever is called better is so called because it possesses a greater share of goodness. Yet it is absurd that the gift of a higher principle should not be better than the gift of an inferior cause. There is a further difficulty. Since all things desire the good, if there were another principle above the Good itself, we must ask whether they desire it or not. If they are said to desire it, they desire something beyond and more than the Good. If they are said not to desire it, it is foolish to claim that effects do not desire the first cause by which they are preserved.
Indeed, goodness itself would be compelled to desire the higher principle, although that is absurd. For the whole ground of desire is contained within goodness itself. Nothing, therefore, stands above goodness that can be loved, and so there is no principle above it. Hence the unity, truth, and goodness that we found above the angel is, in Plato's judgment, the principle of all things: the one God, true and good.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.1.6–II.1.7
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.