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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 24 of 174
Book I · Chapter 3 · §§ 29–31
Latin
p. 50Item sic Proclus et Syrianus ad idem argumentantur. Quod ab alio semper extenditur, necessario dimensionibus est adstrictum. Quod vero extendit, minime. Materia igitur, cum semper ab alio extendatur, necessario dimensionibus obnoxia est. Quia tamen unumquodque prius in se est quodammodo quam extendatur, materia potest individua cogitari. Quapropter principium illud a quo extenditur multo magis potest sine dimensionibus non modo cogitari, sed etiam esse.
Praeterea omne dividuum est quiddam totum unum ex pluribus partibus constitutum. Quae partes nisi haberent in se unum aliquid atque idem cunctis commune, nunquam totum illud conficerent. Non enim fit unum nisi ab uno. Rursus, nisi essent participes unitatis, nulla partium esset unum, sed plura in infinitum, et quaelibet pars innumere infinita. Unum autem illud partibus insitum non est divisum singulatim in singulis. Egeret enim ipsum quoque alio copulante. Ergo est idem totumque in singulis. Tale quiddam incorporale esse necesse est.
Item cum omne corporale sit unum quiddam totum ex partibus, quidnam illius unionis causa est? An totum ipsum unit partes, vel partes totum uniunt? Vel superius aliquid, quod neque pars sit ullius neque totum ex partibus, partes unit invicem et ad totum? Totum partes sequitur potius quam uniat. Ac si admittatur quod unit partes, incorporeum erit. Si enim sit ipsum quoque dividuum, eget alio similiter uniente. Si partes uniunt totum, absurdum id quidem, quod a multitudine unitati opposita fiat unio, quae fieri debet ab unitate. Reliquum est ut praeter partes singulas atque totum adsit aliquid unum, conspirationis illius causa, quod quidem sit incorporeum, ne cogatur ipsum quoque copula indigere, atque ita abeamus in infinitum. Quapropter non est putandum formam aliquam divisam in corpore apicem esse naturae rerumque principium.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book I
p. 51Proclus and Syrianus also argue toward the same conclusion as follows. What is always extended by another is necessarily bound by dimensions; what extends, however, is not. Matter, therefore, since it is always extended by another, is necessarily subject to dimensions. Yet because each thing is in a certain way first in itself before it is extended, matter can be conceived as undivided. Much more, then, can that principle by which it is extended not only be conceived without dimensions, but also exist without them.
Moreover, everything divisible is a certain single whole constituted from several parts. Unless those parts possessed in themselves some one and the same thing common to all, they would never compose that whole, for a unity is made only by a unity. Again, unless they participated in unity, no part would be one, but would be many without end, and every part would be infinitely manifold. Yet that unity present in the parts is not divided portion by portion among the several parts, for it too would then need another thing to bind it together. It is therefore the same and whole in each. Such a thing must be incorporeal.
Again, since everything corporeal is a certain single whole composed of parts, what is the cause of its union? Does the whole itself unite the parts, or do the parts unite the whole? Or does something higher—which is neither a part of anything nor a whole composed of parts—unite the parts both with one another and with the whole? The whole follows from the parts rather than uniting them. And if it is admitted that something unites the parts, that thing will be incorporeal. For if it too were divisible, it would need another thing to unite it in the same way. If the parts unite the whole, that is indeed absurd: union would then be produced by multiplicity, which is opposed to unity, although union ought to be produced by unity. It remains that, in addition to the several parts and the whole, there is present some one thing as the cause of their concord; it must be incorporeal, lest it too be forced to need a bond and we thus proceed to infinity. We must therefore not suppose that any form divided in a body is the summit of nature and the principle of things.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book I · I.3.29–I.3.31
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.