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Robert Burton

The Anatomy of Melancholy

1651 English with a close modern English rendering

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The Anatomy of MelancholyDemocritus Junior to the Reader

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Facing Pages · Branch 68 of 1495

Democritus Junior to the Reader

1651 English

40

So are we fools and ridiculous, absurd in our actions, carriages, dyet, apparel, customs and consultations; we scoffe and point one at another, when as in conclusion all are fools, and they the veriest asses that hide their ears most. A private man if he be resolved with himself, or set on an opinion, accounts all idiots and asses that are not affected as he is, —— nil rectum, nisi quod placuit sibi, ducit, that are not so minded, (quodque volunt homines se bene velle putant) all fools that think not as he doth: he will not say with Atticus, Suam quisque sponsam, mihi meam, let every man enjoy his own spouse; but his alone is fair, suus amor, &c.

and scorns all in respect of himself, wil imitate none, hear none but himself, as Pliny said, a law and example to himself. And that which Hippocrates in his epistle to Dyonysius, reprehended of old, is verified in our times, Quisque in alio superfluum esse censet, ipse quod non habet nec curat, that which he hath not himself or doth not esteem, he accounts superfluity, an idle quality, a meer foppery in another: like Æsops fox, when he had lost his tail, would have all his fellow foxes cut off theirs.

The Chinezes say that we Europeans have one eye, they themselves two, all the world else is blinde: (though Scaliger accounts them Brutes too, merum pecus,) so thou and thy sectaries are only wise, others indifferent, the rest beside themselves, meer idiots and asses. Thus not acknowledging our own errors, and imperfections, we securely deride others, as if we alone were free, and spectators of the rest, accounting it an excellent thing, as indeed it is, Aliena optimum frui insaniâ, to make our selves merry with other mens obliquities, when as he himself is more faulty then the rest:

mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur, he may take himself by the nose for a fool; and which one cals maximum stultitiæ specimen, to be ridiculous to others, and not to perceive or take notice of it, as Marsyas was when he contended with Apollo, non intelligens se deridiculo haberi, saith Apuleius; tis his own cause, he is a convict madman, as Austin wel infers, In the eyes of wise men and Angels he seems like one, that to our thinking walks with his heels upward.

So thou laughest at me, and I at thee, both at a third; and he returns that of the poet upon us again, Hei mihi, insanire me aiunt, quum ipsi ultro insaniant. We accuse others of madnesse, of folly, and are the veriest dizards our selves. For it is a great sign and propertie of a fool (which Eccl. 10. 3. points at) out of pride and self-conceit to insult, vilifie, condemn, censure, and call other men fools (Non videmus manticæ quod à tergo est) to tax that in others, of which we are most faulty; teach that which we follow not our selves:

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The Anatomy of Melancholy: Democritus Junior to the Reader

p. 68

So we are foolish and ridiculous, absurd in our actions, behaviour, food, clothing, customs, and deliberations. We mock and point at one another, though in the end we are all fools, and the greatest asses are those who take most care to hide their ears. An individual, once convinced or fixed in an opinion, counts everyone who does not share his feelings an idiot and an ass: “He considers nothing right except what pleases him.” Those who think differently are all fools in his eyes, for “people think whatever they want is right to want.” He will not say with Atticus, “To each his own bride; to me, mine”—let everyone enjoy his own spouse. His alone is beautiful, “his own love,” and so on.

He despises everyone in comparison with himself, will imitate no one and listen to no one but himself: as Pliny said, he is his own law and example. What Hippocrates long ago rebuked in his letter to Dionysius is borne out in our own time: “Everyone considers superfluous in another what he himself neither possesses nor values.” Whatever he lacks or does not esteem, he calls unnecessary, useless, mere foolishness in someone else—like Aesop’s fox, who, after losing his tail, wanted all the other foxes to cut theirs off.

The Chinese say that we Europeans have one eye, they themselves two, and everyone else is blind—though Scaliger counts them beasts too, “nothing but cattle.” Just so, you and your followers are the only wise people, others are middling, and the rest out of their minds, mere idiots and asses. Failing to acknowledge our own errors and imperfections, we confidently ridicule others, as though we alone were exempt and merely watching everyone else. We think it a fine thing—as indeed it is—“to enjoy other people’s madness,” amusing ourselves with their crooked ways, though the man who laughs is more at fault than the rest.

“Change the name, and the story is about you.” He might take himself by the nose for a fool. What one writer calls “the greatest proof of foolishness” is to be ridiculous to others without noticing it, as Marsyas was when he competed with Apollo, “not realizing he was being made a laughing-stock,” as Apuleius says. The case is his own; he stands convicted of madness. As Augustine aptly concludes, in the eyes of the wise and of angels, he looks like someone who, to our eyes, walks upside down.

So you laugh at me, I at you, and both of us at a third, who turns the poet’s words back upon us: “Alas! They say I am mad, when they themselves are mad.” We accuse others of madness and folly while being the greatest fools ourselves. For it is a chief sign and characteristic of a fool, as Ecclesiastes 10:3 indicates, to domineer, vilify, condemn, criticize, and call others fools out of pride and self-conceit—“we do not see the part of the knapsack behind our backs”—to rebuke in others the faults we are most guilty of, and teach what we do not practise ourselves.

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About This Reading Edition

Robert Burton’s Anatomy ranges across medicine, philosophy, poetry, religion, and everyday life in its inquiry into melancholy. This complete parallel edition pairs the 1651 English text with a close modern English rendering, preserving the three Partitions, Democritus Junior’s address to the reader, verse, and the historical index.

Historical Text and Translation

The historical text follows the sixth edition, printed at Oxford for Henry Cripps in 1651, using the McGill University Library copy. The supplied edition documents missing printed pages 98–99 supplied from another 1651 copy at the Bavarian State Library. Historical folio labels and their irregularities remain visible; web reader numbers identify reflowed passages and do not claim to reproduce PDF pagination.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the close modern English rendering and editorial matter. All 8,755 original and modern passage pairs remain aligned, with verse breaks, italics, continuations, and linked annotations preserved. Burton’s 6,781 historical notes retain their attribution; 6,895 editorial notes remain distinct. The introduction, Note on the Text, contextual lexicon, indexes, source documentation, and bibliography are included. The engraved frontispiece remains available in the original downloads.

Rights

Burton’s historical text is in the public domain. The modern English rendering, introduction, notes, and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. The complete supplied PDF, EPUB, Word, and Markdown files remain available unchanged. The PDF and Word edition preserve the original parallel page layout.