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Robert Burton

The Anatomy of Melancholy

1651 English with a close modern English rendering

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The Anatomy of MelancholySubsection 2 Love’s Origin, Object, Definition and Divisions

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Modern English Page · Branch 676 of 1495

Subsection 2 Love’s Origin, Object, Definition and Divisions

1651 English

412–413

Now this love varies as its object varies, which is alwayes Good, Amiable, Fair, Gracious, and Pleasant: All things desire that which is good, as we are taught in the Ethicks, or at least that which to them seems to be good; quid enim vis mali (as Austin well inferres) dic mihi? puto nihil in omnibus actionibus, thou wilt wish no harm I suppose, no ill in all thine actions, thoughts or desires, nihil mali vis;

thou wilt not have bad corn, bad soil, a naughty tree, but all good; a good servant, a good horse, a good son, a good friend, a good neighbour, a good wife. From this goodness comes Beauty: from Beauty, Grace, and comeliness, which result as so many rayes from their good parts, make us to love, and so to covet it: for were it not pleasing and gracious in our eyes, we should not seek.

No man loves (saith Aristotle 9. mor. cap. 5.) but he that was first delighted with comliness and beauty. As this fair object varies, so doth our love; for as Proclus holds, Omne pulchrum amabile, every fair thing is amiable, and what we love is fair and gratious in our eyes, or at least we do so apprehend and still esteem of it.

Amiableness is the object of love, the scope and end is to obtain it, for whose sake we love, and which our minde covets to enjoy. And it seems to us especially fair and good, for good, fair, and unity, cannot be separated. Beauty shines, Plato saith, and by reason of its splendor and shining causeth admiration: and the fairer the object is, the more eagerly it is sought.

For as the same Plato defines it, Beauty is a lively shining or glittering brightness, resulting from effused good, by ideas, seeds, reasons, shadowes, stirring up our minds, that by this good they may be united and made one.

Others will have beauty to be the perfection of the whole composition, caused out of the congruous symmetry, measure, order and manner of parts, and that comeliness which proceeds from this beauty is called grace, and from thence all fair things are gratious. For grace and beauty are so wonderfully annexed, so sweetly and gently win our souls, and strongly allure, that they confound our judgement and cannot be distinguished. Beauty and Grace are like those beams and shinings that come from the glorious and divine Sun, which are diverse, as they proceed from the diverse objects, to please and affect our severall senses;

As the species of beauty are taken at our eyes, ears, or conceived in our inner soul, as Plato disputes at large in his Dialogue de pulchro, Phædro, Hyppias, and after many sophisticall errours confuted, concludes that beauty is a grace in all things, delighting the eyes, ears, and soul it self; so that as Valesius infers hence, whatsoever pleaseth our ears, eys, and soul, must needs be beautifull, fair, and delightfome to us.

412–413

The Anatomy of Melancholy: Subsection 2 Love’s Origin, Object, Definition and Divisions

p. 676

This love varies as its object varies, and its object is always good, lovable, fair, graceful and pleasant. “All things desire what is good,” as the Ethics teaches us, or at least what seems good to them. “For what bad thing do you want,” as Augustine aptly asks, “tell me? Nothing, I think, in all your actions.” You wish for no harm, I suppose, no evil in any of your actions, thoughts or desires: “you want nothing bad.”

You do not want bad grain, bad soil or a worthless tree, but everything good: a good servant, a good horse, a good son, a good friend, a good neighbour, a good wife. From this goodness comes beauty; from beauty, grace and comeliness, which shine like so many rays from their good qualities and make us love and thus desire it. For if it did not seem pleasing and graceful to our eyes, we would not seek it.

“No one loves,” says Aristotle in book 9, chapter 5 of the Ethics, “unless first delighted by comeliness and beauty.” As this fair object varies, so does our love; for, as Proclus holds, “everything beautiful is lovable.” Every fair thing is lovable, and what we love is fair and graceful in our eyes, or at least that is how we perceive it and continue to regard it.

“Loveliness is the object of love; its aim and end is to obtain that for whose sake we love and which our mind longs to enjoy.” It seems especially fair and good to us, for goodness, beauty and unity cannot be separated. Beauty shines, Plato says, and its splendour and radiance cause wonder; the fairer the object, the more eagerly it is sought.

For, as Plato himself defines it, “Beauty is a living radiance or glittering brightness flowing from goodness poured forth through ideas, seeds, formative principles and shadows, stirring our minds so that through this goodness they may be united and made one.”

Others take beauty to be the perfection of the whole composition, “arising from the harmonious symmetry, measure, order and arrangement of its parts. The comeliness that proceeds from this beauty is called grace, and hence all fair things are graceful.” Grace and beauty are so wonderfully joined, “so sweetly and gently win our souls, and attract them so powerfully, that they confound our judgement and cannot be distinguished. Beauty and grace are like the beams and radiance of the glorious, divine sun.” They differ as they proceed from different objects to please and affect our several senses.

“Forms of beauty are received through our eyes and ears, or conceived within our soul,” as Plato discusses at length in his dialogue On Beauty, in Phaedrus and Hippias. After refuting many sophistical errors, he concludes that beauty is a grace in all things, delighting the eyes, ears and soul itself. Thus, as Valesius infers, whatever pleases our ears, eyes and soul must be beautiful, fair and delightful to us.

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About This Reading Edition

Robert Burton’s Anatomy ranges across medicine, philosophy, poetry, religion, and everyday life in its inquiry into melancholy. This complete parallel edition pairs the 1651 English text with a close modern English rendering, preserving the three Partitions, Democritus Junior’s address to the reader, verse, and the historical index.

Historical Text and Translation

The historical text follows the sixth edition, printed at Oxford for Henry Cripps in 1651, using the McGill University Library copy. The supplied edition documents missing printed pages 98–99 supplied from another 1651 copy at the Bavarian State Library. Historical folio labels and their irregularities remain visible; web reader numbers identify reflowed passages and do not claim to reproduce PDF pagination.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the close modern English rendering and editorial matter. All 8,755 original and modern passage pairs remain aligned, with verse breaks, italics, continuations, and linked annotations preserved. Burton’s 6,781 historical notes retain their attribution; 6,895 editorial notes remain distinct. The introduction, Note on the Text, contextual lexicon, indexes, source documentation, and bibliography are included. The engraved frontispiece remains available in the original downloads.

Rights

Burton’s historical text is in the public domain. The modern English rendering, introduction, notes, and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. The complete supplied PDF, EPUB, Word, and Markdown files remain available unchanged. The PDF and Word edition preserve the original parallel page layout.