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Robert Burton

The Anatomy of Melancholy

Name: The Anatomy of Melancholy
Author: Robert Burton

1651 English with a close modern English rendering

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The Anatomy of MelancholySubsection 2 Love’s Origin, Object, Definition and Divisions

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1651 English Page · Branch 675 of 1495

Subsection 2 Love’s Origin, Object, Definition and Divisions

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1651 English

411–412

SUBSECT. 2. Loves Beginning, Object, Definition, Division.

Loves limits are ample and great, and a spatious walk it hath, beset with thorns, and for that cause, which Scaliger reprehends in Cardan, not lightly to be passed over. Least I incur the same censure, I will examine all the kinds of love, his nature, beginning, difference, objects, how it is honest or dishonest, a vertue or vice, a naturall passion or a disease, his power and effects, how far it extends:

of which, although something hath been said in the first Partition, in those Sections of Perturbations (for love and hatred are the first and most common passions, from which all the rest arise, and are attendant, as Picolomineus holds, or as Nich. Caussinus, the primum mobile of all other affections, which carry them all about them) I will now more copiously dilate, through all his parts and severall branches, that so it may better appear what Love is, and how it varies with the objects, how in defect, or (which is most ordinary and common) immoderate, and in excess, causeth melancholy.

Love universally taken, is defined to be a Desire, as a word of more ample signification: and though Leon Hebreus the most copious writer of this subject, in his third Dialogue make no difference, yet in his first he distinguisheth them again, and defines love by desire. Love is a voluntary affection, and desire to enjoy that which is good. Desire wisheth, Love enjoyes; the end of the one is the beginning of the other: that which we love is present; that which we desire is absent.

It is worth the labour, saith Plotinus, to consider well of Love, whether it be a God or a Divell, or passion of the minde, or partly God, partly Divell, partly passion. He concludes Love to participate of all three, to arise from desire of that which is beautifull and fair, and defines it to be an action of the mind desiring that which is good.

Plato calls it the great Divell, for its vehemency, and soveraignty over all other passions, and defines it an appetite, by which we desire some good to be present. Ficinus in his Comment addes the word Fair to this definition, Love is a desire of enjoying that which is good and fair.

Austin dilates this common definition, and will have love to be a delectation of the heart, for something which we seek to win, or joy to have, coveting by desire, resting in joy. Scaliger Exerc. 301. taxeth these former definitions, and will not have love to be defined by Desire or Appetite: for when we enjoy the things we desire, there remaines no more appetite: as he defines it, Love is an affection by which we are either united to the thing we love, or perpetuate our union; which agrees in part with Leon Hebreus.

8210.BurtonPrinted page 411, r: “Exerc. 301. Campus amoris maximus & spinis obsitus, nec levissimo pede transvolandus.” Exercise 301: “The field of love is vast and strewn with thorns, and must not be skimmed over with the lightest step.”

8212.BurtonPrinted page 411, s: “Grad. 1. cap. 29. Ex Platone, primæ & communissimæ perturbationes ex quibus ceteræ oriuntur & earum sunt pedissequæ.” Grade 1, chapter 29. From Plato: “The first and most common passions, from which the others arise and upon which they attend.”

8214.BurtonPrinted page 411, t: “Amor est voluntarius affectus & desiderium re bona fruendi.” “Love is a voluntary affection and a desire to enjoy a good thing.”

8215.BurtonPrinted page 412, u: “Desiderium optantis, amor eorum quibus fruimur; amoris principium, desiderii finis, amatum adest.” “Desire belongs to one who wishes; love to the things we enjoy. The beginning of love is the end of desire: the beloved is present.”

8217.BurtonPrinted page 412, x: “Principio l. de amore. Operæ pretium est de amore considerare, utrum Deus, an Dæmon, an passio quædam animæ, an partim Deus, partim Dæmon, passio partim, &c. Amor est actus animi bonum desiderans.” At the beginning of the book On Love: “It is worth considering love: whether it is a god, a spirit, a certain passion of the soul, or partly god, partly spirit and partly passion, and so on. Love is an act of the mind desiring good.”

8219.BurtonPrinted page 412, y: “Magnus Dæmon, convivio.” “A great spirit,” in the Symposium.

8220.BurtonPrinted page 412, z: “Boni pulchriq; fruendi desiderium.” “The desire to enjoy what is good and beautiful.”

8222.BurtonPrinted page 412, a: “Godefridus, l. 1. cap. 2. Amor est delectatio cordis, alicujus ad aliquid, propter aliquod desiderium in appetendo, & gaudium perfruendo per desiderium currens, requiescens per gaudium.” Godefridus, book 1, chapter 2: “Love is a delight of someone’s heart in something, through a certain desire in seeking and joy in enjoying, running through desire and resting through joy.”

8223.BurtonPrinted page 412, b: “Non est amor desiderium aut appetitus ut ab omnibus hactenus traditum; nam cum potimur amata re, non manet appetitus; est igitur affectus quo cum re amata aut unimur, aut unionem perpetuamus.” “Love is not desire or appetite, as everyone has hitherto taught; for when we possess the beloved thing, appetite does not remain. It is therefore an affection by which we are either united with the beloved thing or maintain that union.”

The Anatomy of Melancholy: Subsection 2 Love’s Origin, Object, Definition and Divisions

p. 675

SUBSECTION 2 Love’s origin, object, definition and divisions

“Love’s territory is broad and vast, with a spacious path beset by thorns,” and therefore, as Scaliger rebukes Cardan, “it must not be passed over lightly.” To avoid the same criticism, I will examine every kind of love: its nature, origin, differences and objects; how it is honourable or dishonourable, a virtue or a vice, a natural passion or a disease; its power, its effects and how far it extends.

Although I said something about it in the First Partition, in the sections on the passions—for “love and hatred are the first and most common passions, from which all the rest arise and on which they attend,” as Piccolomini holds; or, as Nicolas Caussin puts it, they are the first moving sphere of all the other affections, carrying them all around with them—I shall now discuss all its parts and branches more fully. In this way it may become clearer what love is, how it varies with its objects, and how its deficiency, or more commonly its immoderate excess, causes melancholy.

Love, taken in its broadest sense, is defined as desire, a word of wider meaning. Although Leone Ebreo, the most expansive writer on this subject, makes no distinction between them in his third Dialogue, in his first he distinguishes them again and defines love through desire: “Love is a voluntary affection and a desire to enjoy what is good.” “Desire wishes; love enjoys. The end of one is the beginning of the other: what we love is present; what we desire is absent.”

“It is worth the effort,” says Plotinus, to consider love carefully: “whether it is a god, a spirit, a passion of the mind, or partly god, partly spirit and partly passion.” He concludes that love shares in all three and arises from desire for what is beautiful and fair, and defines it as “an action of the mind desiring what is good.”

Plato calls it “the great spirit” because of its force and mastery over all the other passions, and defines it as an appetite “by which we desire some good to be present.” Ficino adds the word “fair” to this definition in his commentary: love is a desire to enjoy what is good and fair.

Augustine expands this common definition, taking love to be a delight of the heart “in something we seek to gain or rejoice to possess, reaching out in desire and resting in joy.” Scaliger, in Exercise 301, criticizes these earlier definitions and refuses to define love through desire or appetite: “when we enjoy the things we desire, appetite no longer remains.” He defines it instead as “an affection by which we are either united with what we love or maintain our union with it.” This partly agrees with Leone Ebreo.

8211.“Object” means that towards which love is directed. “Honest” means morally honourable. The subsection begins an account broad enough to include natural attraction, affection, desire and love of God, not only erotic love.

8213.Primum mobile is the first moving sphere in the older astronomical model, imagined to carry the others around with it. Here the image makes love and hatred the movers of other passions. Piccolomini and Caussin supply the stated authorities; exact editions remain for collation.

8216.Leone Ebreo is the author of the Dialogues of Love. Burton first treats desire as the wider term, then reports a distinction between wishing for an absent good and enjoying a present one; these formulations should not be forced into a single consistent definition.

8218.Plotinus, Enneads 3.5.1, opens with the alternatives of god, daemon and passion. Burton’s “Divell” translates daemon; “spirit” here preserves its ancient philosophical sense without implying an evil Christian devil. Burton’s subsequent conclusion remains his summary of Plotinus.

8221.Plato’s “great daemon” occurs in Symposium 202d–e. The margin’s z includes both good and beautiful, although Burton says in the body that Ficino adds “fair.” The discrepancy is retained. “Appetite” means an inclination or desire generally, not merely hunger.

8224.The body names Augustine, while the margin cites Godefridus, book 1, chapter 2, for the definition. Both attributions are preserved. Scaliger’s objection turns on whether love continues when desire has been satisfied; his alternative makes union central.

About This Reading Edition

Robert Burton’s Anatomy ranges across medicine, philosophy, poetry, religion, and everyday life in its inquiry into melancholy. This complete parallel edition pairs the 1651 English text with a close modern English rendering, preserving the three Partitions, Democritus Junior’s address to the reader, verse, and the historical index.

Historical Text and Translation

The historical text follows the sixth edition, printed at Oxford for Henry Cripps in 1651, using the McGill University Library copy. The supplied edition documents missing printed pages 98–99 supplied from another 1651 copy at the Bavarian State Library. Historical folio labels and their irregularities remain visible; web reader numbers identify reflowed passages and do not claim to reproduce PDF pagination.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the close modern English rendering and editorial matter. All 8,755 original and modern passage pairs remain aligned, with verse breaks, italics, continuations, and linked annotations preserved. Burton’s 6,781 historical notes retain their attribution; 6,895 editorial notes remain distinct. The introduction, Note on the Text, contextual lexicon, indexes, source documentation, and bibliography are included. The engraved frontispiece remains available in the original downloads.

Rights

Burton’s historical text is in the public domain. The modern English rendering, introduction, notes, and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. The complete supplied PDF, EPUB, Word, and Markdown files remain available unchanged. The PDF and Word edition preserve the original parallel page layout.