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Modern English Page · Branch 165 of 1495
Subsection 11. the Will
1651 English
29–30SUBSEC. 11. Of the will.
Will, is the other power of the rationall soul, which covets or avoids such things as have been before judged, and apprehended by the understanding. If good, it approves; if evill, it abhorres it: so that his object is either good or evill. Aristotle cals this our rationall Appetite; for as in the Sensitive we are moved to good or bad by our Appetite, ruled & directed by Sense; so in this we are carried by Reason. Besides, the Sensitive Appetite hath a particular object, good or bad; this an universall, immateriall: That respects onely things delectable and pleasant, this honest.
Againe, they differ in liberty. The Sensuall appetite seeing an object, if it be a convenient good, cannot but desire it; if evill, avoid it: but this is free in his essence, much now depraved, obscured, and falne from his first perfection; yet in some of his operations still free, as to goe, walke, move at his pleasure, and to choose whether it will do, or not do, steale, or not steale. Otherwise in vaine were Laws, Deliberations, Exhortations, Counsels, Precepts, Rewards, Promises, Threats and Punishments: and God should be the author of sin.
But in Spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (except we be regenerate, and led by the Spirit) we are egged on by our natural concupiscence, and there is ἀταξία, a confusion in our powers; our whole will is averse from God and his law, not in natural things only, as to eat and drink, lust, to which we are led headlong by our temperature and inordinate appetite,
Nec nos obniti contra, nec tendere tantum Sufficimus, —we cannot resist, our concupiscence is originally bad, our heart evil, the seat of our affections, captivates and enforceth our will. So that in voluntary things we are averse from God and goodnesse, bad by nature, by ignorance worse, by Art, Discipline, Custom, we get many bad habits: suffering them to domineer and tyrannize over us; and the devil is still ready at hand with his evil suggestions, to tempt our depraved will to some ill disposed action, to precipitate us to destruction,
except our Will be swayed and counterpoised again with some divine precepts, and good motions of the spirit, which many times restrain, hinder and check us, when we are in the full career of our dissolute courses. So David, corrected himself, when he had Saul at a vantage. Revenge and Malice were as two violent oppugners on the one side; but Honesty, Religion, Fear of God, with-held him on the other.
The actions of the Will are Velle and Nolle, to well and nill, which two words comprehend all, and they are good or bad, accordingly as they are directed: and some of them freely performed by himself; although the Stoicks absolutely deny it, and will have all things inevitably done by Destiny, imposing a fatal necessity upon us, which we may not resist: yet we say that our will is free in respect of us, and things contingent, howsoever in respect of Gods determinate counsel, they are inevitable and necessary.
Some other actions of the will are performed by the inferiour powers, which obey him, as the Sensitive and Moving Appetite; as to open our eyes, to go hither and thither, not to touch a book, to speak fair or foule: but this Appetite is many times rebellious in us, and will not be contained within the lists of sobriety and temperance. It was (as I said) once well agreeing with reason, and there was an excellent content and harmony betwixt them, but that is now dissolved, they often jar; Reason is overborne by Passion:
The Anatomy of Melancholy: Subsection 11. the Will
p. 165Subsection 11. The Will
Will is the other power of the rational soul. It desires or avoids things that the understanding has already apprehended and judged. If they are good, it approves them; if evil, it rejects them. Its object is therefore good or evil. Aristotle calls it our rational appetite: just as, in the sensitive soul, appetite moves us towards good or bad under the guidance and direction of sense, so here reason moves us. Moreover, sensitive appetite has a particular object, good or bad, while the will has a universal, immaterial object. The former concerns only what is delightful and pleasant; the latter, what is morally honourable.
They also differ in freedom. When sensitive appetite encounters an object, it cannot help desiring it if it is a good suited to it, or avoiding it if it is evil. The will, however, is free in its essence. Though now greatly corrupted, clouded and fallen from its original perfection, it remains free in some of its operations: to go, walk or move as it pleases; to choose whether to act or refrain, to steal or not to steal. Otherwise laws, deliberations, exhortations, advice, precepts, rewards, promises, threats and punishments would be useless, and God would be the author of sin.
But in spiritual matters we will no good and incline to evil, unless we are born again and led by the Spirit. Our natural concupiscence urges us on, and there is disorder—a confusion in our powers. Our whole will turns away from God and his law, not only in natural matters such as eating, drinking and sexual desire, towards which our temperament and unruly appetite drive us headlong:
We have not strength enough to struggle against it Or to exert ourselves so far.
We cannot resist. Our concupiscence is bad from its origin; our evil heart, the seat of our emotions, enslaves and compels our will. Thus, in voluntary actions we turn away from God and goodness: bad by nature, worse through ignorance. Through art, training and custom we acquire many bad habits and allow them to dominate and tyrannize over us. The devil is always at hand with his evil suggestions, ready to tempt our corrupted will into some wicked action and plunge us into destruction,
unless our will is brought back into balance by divine precepts and good impulses from the Spirit. These often restrain, obstruct and check us when we are rushing at full speed along our dissolute course. Thus David checked himself when he had Saul at his mercy. Revenge and malice pressed violently upon him on one side; moral integrity, religion and the fear of God held him back on the other.
The will’s acts are willing and refusing: these two words cover them all. They are good or bad according to their direction, and some are freely performed by the will itself. The Stoics deny this absolutely, holding that everything occurs inevitably through destiny, which imposes an inescapable necessity upon us. Yet we say that our will is free in relation to ourselves and to contingent things, however inevitable and necessary they may be in relation to God’s fixed purpose.
Other acts of the will are performed by the lower powers that obey it, such as sensitive appetite and the appetite that moves the body: opening our eyes, going here and there, not touching a book, speaking courteously or abusively. But this appetite often rebels in us and refuses to stay within the bounds of sobriety and self-restraint. As I said, it once agreed well with reason, and an excellent accord and harmony existed between them. That harmony has now dissolved; they often clash, and passion overpowers reason:
Socrates
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Robert Burton’s Anatomy ranges across medicine, philosophy, poetry, religion, and everyday life in its inquiry into melancholy. This complete parallel edition pairs the 1651 English text with a close modern English rendering, preserving the three Partitions, Democritus Junior’s address to the reader, verse, and the historical index.
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