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The places. The apothecary makes a medicinal compound. (p. 230; DJR-070-02.) Chemical preparations are praised by Mattioli. (p. 372; DJR-100-44.)
In this edition. “confection” → “compound” (DJR-070-02); “Chymicall Confections” → “chemical preparations” (DJR-100-44). Compound and preparations express the pharmaceutical sense without implying confectionery.
Confer and conference
Source forms: conference; confer
The word. Conference can mean conversation. Confer can mean either to converse or to compare; its object and construction distinguish the senses.
In Burton. Conversation is recommended as nourishment for the troubled mind. In the consolation for discontent, conferring oneself with others means comparing circumstances. The love discussion uses confer with the beloved for conversation, then confer hand to hand for comparing appearances. Similar wording thus serves both social exchange and deliberate examination.
The places. Continual conversation is proposed as mental nourishment. (p. 283; DJR-081-30.) People neglect to compare their circumstances with others’. (p. 310; DJR-087-17.) A lover struggles to avoid conversation with the beloved. (p. 551; DJR-135-24.) Comparison of appearances is offered as a test. (p. 558; DJR-136-47.)
In this edition. “continuall conference” → “continual conversation” (DJR-081-30); “confer themselves with others” → “comparing ourselves with them” (DJR-087-17); “confer with them” → “converse with them” (DJR-135-24); “confer hand to hand” → “Compare hand with hand” (DJR-136-47). Conversation, converse and compare follow the separate actions in the passages. Conference does not require a formal meeting.
See also. Action; Conversation; Intention and remission; Impertinent.
Conscience
The word. Conscience concerns moral judgment and obligation. To make conscience of something is to regard it as a matter of moral scruple; a scrupulous conscience is troubled by excessive doubts.
In Burton. The account of despair connects a scrupulous conscience with a melancholy constitution. Elsewhere making conscience of nothing describes moral insensibility, expressed through the image of searing. The accusation that someone never made conscience of wrongdoing belongs to a sustained rhetorical catalogue. The same vocabulary can therefore describe burdensome doubt or the absence of restraint.
The places. Scrupulous conscience is linked with bodily constitution. (p. 695; DJR-164-09.) Seared consciences are accused of feeling no scruple. (p. 690; DJR-163-01.) Making conscience of wrongdoing appears in an accusatory address. (p. 711; DJR-167-18.)
In this edition. “Conscientia scrupulosa” → “A scrupulous conscience” (DJR-164-09); “make a conscience of nothing” → “feel no scruple about anything” (DJR-163-01); “never mad’st any conscience” → “never had any scruple” (DJR-167-18). Scruple makes the idiom explicit, while scrupulous conscience retains the name of the troubling moral condition.
See also. Reason; Faith and assurance; Synderesis; Satisfaction; Venial sin; Temptation.
Consent and essence
Source forms: consent; by essence; by consent; Essence
The word. By essence means that a disorder originates in the affected part itself. By consent means that it affects that part through sympathy or communication with another part; consent here is physiological connection rather than agreement.
In Burton. Burton compares the mind’s harmful effects on the body with bodily disease affecting the soul by consent. The symptom classification then distinguishes illness originating in the head from a brain affected through another part. The latter account traces the disturbance to the womb and its supposed vapours. The pair identifies proposed origins and routes of affection.
The places. Body and soul affect one another by sympathy. (p. 173; DJR-056-47.) Signs are assigned to illness originating in the head. (p. 198; DJR-062-04.) The brain is said to be affected through another bodily part. (p. 202; DJR-062-30.)
In this edition. “by consent” → “through their mutual sympathy” (DJR-056-47); “by essence in the head” → “originates in the head itself” (DJR-062-04); “not in essence, but by consent” → “through sympathy with another part, rather than through a disorder originating in itself” (DJR-062-30). The expanded rendering makes the distinction legible without turning consent into a mental choice.
See also. Hypochondria; Cause.
Constancy
Source forms: constantly; constancy
The word. Constancy means firmness or steadfastness. Constantly can describe the strength of a belief or resolution rather than how often something happens.
In Burton. Elionora Meliorina constantly believes herself married to a king: the adverb marks conviction. The account of Atticus uses it for settled resolution, while the advice on calming the mind recommends constancy alongside cheerfulness and hope. Firmness can therefore qualify a mistaken belief, a determined action or a sustaining disposition; it does not itself establish that its object is sound.
The places. A reported belief is held firmly. (p. 194; DJR-061-05.) Atticus maintains a settled resolution. (p. 217; DJR-066-09.) Steadfastness is recommended in calming the mind. (p. 289; DJR-083-03.)
In this edition. “constantly beleeved” → “firmly believed” (DJR-061-05); “constantly” → “steadfastly” (DJR-066-09); “constancy” → “steadfastness” (DJR-083-03). Firmly and steadfastly preserve the manner of belief or action. Continually would suggest duration or repetition instead.
See also. Happiness and fortune.
Continence
Source forms: incontinent; inforced temperance; incontinency; contain; continency
The word. Continence is self-restraint, often specifically sexual restraint. Incontinent and incontinency can denote its absence. Contain can mean restrain more generally, as its object requires.
In Burton. The medical passages call some patients incontinent and offer bodily explanations of sexual desire. Burton’s polemic against compulsory celibacy calls it enforced temperance. Elsewhere authority fails to contain people in general, while the story of Abdolominus praises continency among qualities fitting a ruler. The term therefore extends beyond sexual abstinence to command of conduct.
The places. Incontinent qualifies sexual conduct. (p. 201; DJR-062-21.) Enforced temperance names compulsory sexual restraint. (p. 205; DJR-063-15.) Incontinency receives a humoral explanation. (p. 208; DJR-064-10.) Authorities fail to restrain people. (p. 313–314; DJR-088-14.) Self-restraint is praised in a future king. (p. 422–423; DJR-110-32.)
In this edition. “incontinent” → “sexually unrestrained” (DJR-062-21); “inforced temperance” → “enforced continence” (DJR-063-15); “incontinency” → “Sexual incontinence” (DJR-064-10); “contain us” → “restrain us” (DJR-088-14); “continency” → “self-restraint” (DJR-110-32). The sexual qualification is stated where the context requires it. General restraint remains general in the passages about conduct and kingship.
See also. Venery.
Contingence
The word. Contingence denotes events that need not occur as they do. In the cited polemic it is set against providential government.
In Burton. Burton accuses a group of thinkers of attributing everything to natural causes and contingency while treating religion as fiction. The phrase reports the position he attacks, alongside hostile descriptions attributed to Melanchthon and Vanini. It should not be detached from that argumentative setting and treated as a neutral survey of those writers’ philosophies.
The places. Contingency is invoked in the attack on denials of providence. (p. 687; DJR-162-14.)