For an inconstant man to write of constancy, a prophane liver prescribe rules of sanctity and piety, a dizard himself make a treatise of wisdom, or with Salust to rail down right at spoilers of countreys, and yet in office to be a most grievous poler himself. This argues weakness, and is an evident sign of such parties indiscretion. Peccat uter nostrum cruce dignius? Who is the fool now?

Or else peradventure in some places we are all mad for company, and so tis not seen, Satietas erroris & dementiæ, pariter absurditatem & admirationem tollit. Tis with us, as it was of old (in Tullies censure at least) with C. Fimbria in Rome, a bold, hair-brain, mad fellow, and so esteemed of all, such only excepted, that were as mad as himself: now in such a case there is no notice taken of it. Nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eò quod Maxima pars hominum morbo jactatur eodem. When all are mad, where all are like opprest, Who can discern one mad man from the rest?

But put case they do perceive it, and some one be manifestly convict of madnes, he now takes notice of his folly, be it in action, gesture, speech, a vain humor he hath in building, bragging, jangling, spending, gaming, courting, scribling, prating, for which he is ridiculous to others, on which he dotes, he doth acknowledge as much: yet with all the Rhetorick thou hast, thou canst not so recall him, but to the contrary notwithstanding, he will persevere in his dotage.

Tis amabilis insania, & mentis gratissimus error, so pleasing, so delicious, that he cannot leave it. He knows his error, but will not seek to decline it, tell him what the event will be, beggery, sorrow, sicknesse, disgrace, shame, losse, madnesse; yet an angry man will prefer vengeance, a lascivious his whore, a thief his booty, a glutton his belly before his welfare. Tell an Epicure, a covetous man, an ambitious man of his irregular course, wein him from it a little, pol me occidistis amici, he cries anon, you have undone him, and as a dog to his vomit, he returns to it again:

no perswasion will take place, no counsell, say what thou canst, Clames licet & mare cœlo —— Confundas, surdo narras, demonstrate as Ulysses did to Elpenor and Gryllus, and the rest of his companions those swinish men, he is irrefragable in his humor, he will be a hog still; bray him in a morter, he will be the same.

If he be in an heresie, or some perverse opinion, setled as some of our ignorant Papists are, convince his understanding, shew him the several follies, and absurd fopperies of that sect, force him to say, veris vincor, make it as clear as the Sun, he will erre still, peevish and obstinate as he is; and as he said si in hoc erro, libenter erro, nec hunc errorem auferri mihi volo; I will do as I have done, as my predecessors have done, and as my friends now do: I will dote for company.

Say now, are these men mad or no, Heus age responde? are they ridiculous? cedo quemvis arbitrum, are they sanæ mentis, sober, wise, and discreet? have they common sense? —— uter est insanior horum?

I am of Democritus opinion for my part, I hold them worthy to be laughed at; a company of brain-sick disards, as mad as Orestes and Athamas, that they may go ride the ass, & all sail along to the Anticyræ, in the ship of fools for company together. I need not much labor to prove this which I say otherwise then thus, make any solemn protestation, or swear, I think you will beleeve me without an oath; say at a word, are they fools? I refer it to you, though you be likewise fools and madmen your selves, and I as mad to ask the question; for what said our comical Mercurie? Justum ab injustis petere insipientia est. Ile stand to your censure yet, what think you?

But for as much as I undertook at first, that Kingdoms, Provinces, families, were melancholy as well as private men, I will examin them in particular, and that which I have hitherto dilated at random, in more general terms, I will particularly insist in, prove with more special and evident arguments, testimonies, illustrations, and that in brief. Nunc accipe quare desipiant omnes æque ac tu.

My first argument is borrowed from Solomon, an arrow drawn out of his sententious quiver, Pro. 3.7. Be not wise in thine own eyes. And 26.12. Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? more hope is of a fool then of him. Isay pronounceth a woe against such men. cap. 5.21. that are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight. For hence we may gather, that it is a great offence, and men are much deceived that think too well of themselves, an especial argument to convince them of folly.

Many men (saith Seneca) had been without question wise, had they not had an opinion that they had attained to perfection of knowledge already, even before they had gone half way, too forward, too ripe, præproperi, too quick and ready, cito prudentes, cito pii, cito mariti, cito patres, cito sacerdotes, cito omnis officii capaces & curiosi,

they had too good a conceipt of themselves, and that marred all; of their worth, valour, skil, art, learning, judgement, eloquence, their good parts; all their geese are swans, and that manifestly proves them to be no better then fools. In former times they had but seven wise men, now you can scarce finde so many fools.