force at hand fit for battle. Nevertheless, 8000 of those who remained were brought together, over whom Centenius, one of the patricians, although a private citizen, was appointed commander, there being no regular officer present, and sent into Umbria to the Plestine marshes to occupy the narrow passages which offered the shortest way to Rome. In the meantime Flaminius, who guarded the interior of Italy with 30,000 men, learning of the rapidity of Hannibal’s movement, changed his position hastily, giving his army no chance to rest. Fearing for the safety of the city and being inexperienced in war (for he had been wafted into power on a popular breeze), he hastened to engage with Hannibal.

The latter, well aware of his rashness and inexperience, moved forward and took a position with a mountain and a lake [Thrasimenus] before him, concealing his light-armed troops and his cavalry in a ravine. Flaminius, seeing the enemy’s camp in the early morning, delayed a little to let his men rest from their toilsome march and to fortify his camp, after which he led them straightway to battle, although they were still weary with night-watches and hard labor. Caught between the mountain and the lake and the enemy (for the ambush suddenly appeared everywhere), he lost his own life, and 20,000 men were slain with him. The remaining 10,000 escaped to a village strongly fortified by nature. Maharbal, Hannibal’s lieutenant, who had himself acquired very great renown in war, not being able to take them easily and thinking it unwise to fight with desperate men, persuaded them to lay down their arms, agreeing that they should go free wherever they pleased.

When they had complied with this agreement he brought them disarmed to Hannibal. The latter, denying that Maharbal had authority to make such an agreement without his consent, nevertheless treated the Roman allies with kindness and sent them home without ransom, in order to conciliate their towns. He kept all the Romans as prisoners. He gave the booty to the Gauls who were serving with him, in order to attach them to him by the hope of gain, and then marched forward. When this news reached the consul Servilius on the Po, he marched to Etruria with 40,000 men. Centenius, with his 8000, had already occupied the narrow passage previously mentioned.

When Hannibal saw the Plestine marsh and the mountain overhanging it, and Centenius between them guarding the passage, he inquired of the guides whether there was any way around. When they said there was no path but that the whole region was rugged and precipitous, he, nevertheless, sent a body of light-armed troops, under the command of Maharbal, to explore the district and pass around the mountain by night. When he judged that they had reached their destination he attacked Centenius in front. While the engagement was in progress, Maharbal was seen pushing forward strenuously on the summit above, where he raised a shout. The Romans thus surrounded took to flight, and there was a great slaughter among them, 3000 being killed and 800 taken prisoners. The remainder escaped with difficulty. When this news reached the city they feared lest Hannibal should march against them at once. They collected stones upon the walls, and the old men armed themselves. Being in want of arms they took down from the temples

those that had been hung there as trophies of former wars, and, as was customary in times of great danger, they chose a dictator, Fabius Maximus being selected.

But divine Providence turned Hannibal away toward the Adriatic, where he ravaged the sea-coast and gathered vast plunder. The consul Servilius, marching parallel with him, came to Ariminum, being distant from Hannibal by one day’s march. He retained his army there in order to hearten those Gauls who were still friendly to Rome. When Fabius Maximus, the dictator, arrived, he sent to Rome Servilius, who could be no longer either consul or general after a dictator had been chosen. Fabius followed Hannibal closely, but did not come to an engagement with him, although often challenged. He kept careful watch on his enemy’s movements, and lay near him and prevented him from besieging any town. After the country was exhausted Hannibal began to be short of provisions. So he traversed it again, drawing his army up each day and offering battle. Fabius would not come to an engagement, although his master of horse, Minucius Rufus, disapproved of his policy, and wrote to his friends in Rome that Fabius held back on account of cowardice. As Fabius had occasion to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, the command of the army fell to Minucius, and he had a sort of a fight with Hannibal, and as he thought he had the best of it he grew bolder and wrote to the

Senate accusing Fabius of not wanting to win a victory; and the Senate, when Fabius had returned to the camp, voted that his master of horse should share the command equally with him.

They accordingly divided the army and encamped near each other; and each held to his own opinion, Fabius seeking to exhaust Hannibal by the lapse of time and meanwhile to receive no damage from him, while Minucius was eager for a decisive fight. Shortly afterward Minucius joined battle, and Fabius looked on to see what would happen, holding his own forces well in hand. In this way he was enabled to receive Minucius when he was beaten, and to drive Hannibal’s men back from the pursuit. Thus did Fabius save Minucius from a great disaster, bearing him no malice for his slander. Then Minucius, recognizing his own want of experience, laid down his command and delivered his part of the army to Fabius, who held to the belief that the only time for a skilful captain to fight is when it is necessary. This maxim, at a later time, was often brought to mind by Augustus, who was slow to fight and preferred to win by art rather than by valor. Fabius continued to watch Hannibal as before and prevented him from ravaging the country, not coming to an engagement with his whole army but merely cutting off stragglers, well knowing that Hannibal would soon be short of supplies.

They were now approaching a narrow pass of which Hannibal was ignorant. Fabius sent forward 4000 men to occupy it, keeping the remainder of his force at the other extremity where he encamped on a strong hill. When Hannibal

discovered that he had been caught between Fabius and the defended pass he was more alarmed than he had ever been before, for there was no way of escape, but all the country round about was rugged and precipitous. He could not hope to overcome Fabius or those defending the pass, on account of the difficulties of the ground. In this desperate situation he put to death his 5000 prisoners lest they should add a new tumult to the danger. Then he tied torches to the horns of all the cattle he had in the camp (and there were many), and when night came he lighted the torches, extinguished all the camp fires, and commanded the strictest silence. Then he ordered the most courageous of his young men to drive the cattle up the rocky places between Fabius and the pass. These, urged on by their drivers and burned by the torches, ran furiously up the mountain side, and if any of them fell down they would get up and run on again.

The Romans on either side when they observed the silence and darkness in Hannibal’s camp and the many and various lights on the mountain side, could not exactly make out what was taking place, because it was night. Fabius, indeed, suspected that it was some stratagem of Hannibal’s, but not being sure he kept his army in its position on account of the darkness. But those who held the pass imagined, just as Hannibal wished, that in his extremity he was trying to escape by scaling the cliffs above. So they hastened away to the place where they saw the lights, in order to catch Hannibal there in difficulties. The latter, when he discovered that the pass was deserted, advanced

with a flying detachment, in dead silence and without light, in order to conceal the movement. Having seized the pass and strengthened his position he made a signal by trumpet, and the army in camp answered him with a shout and immediately relighted the fires. Then the Romans saw that they had been deceived. The remainder of Hannibal’s army and those who drove the cattle now advanced to the pass without fear, and when he had brought them all together he moved forward. Thus did Hannibal succeed beyond expectation and rescue his army from danger. Thence he advanced to Geronia, a city of Apulia, which was well stored with provisions. This town he captured, and here went into winter quarters in the midst of abundance.

Fabius, pursuing the same policy as before, followed and encamped at a distance of ten stades from Geronia, with the river Aufidus flowing between them. The six months which limited the terms of dictators among the Romans now expired, and the consuls Servilius and Atilius resumed their offices and came to the camp, and Fabius returned to Rome. During the winter frequent skirmishes took place between Hannibal and the Romans in which the latter were generally successful, and showed to the better advantage. Hannibal was all the time writing exultingly to the Carthaginians about the events of the war, but now, having lost many men and being in want of assistance, he asked them to send him soldiers and money. But his enemies, who had jeered at all of his doings, replied that they could not understand how Hannibal should be asking for help when he said he was winning victories, since victorious generals did not ask for money but sent it

home to their own people. The Carthaginians followed their suggestion and sent neither soldiers nor money. Hannibal, lamenting this short-sighted policy, wrote to his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, telling him to make an incursion into Italy at the beginning of summer with what men and money he could raise, and ravage the other extremity so that the whole country might be wasted at once and the Romans exhausted by the double encounter. Such was the situation of Hannibal’s affairs.

The Romans, distressed by the magnitude of the disasters to Flaminius and Centenius, and considering such a succession of surprising defeats unworthy of their dignity, and that a war within their own territory was not to be tolerated, and furious against Hannibal, levied four new legions in the city to serve against him, and hurried the allied forces from all quarters to Apulia. As consuls they chose Lucius Aemilius, who had acquired military fame in the war against the Illyrians, and Terentius Varro, a demagogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sounding promises. When they sent the consuls forward they begged them as they were leaving the city to end the war by battle, and not to exhaust the city by delay, by conscriptions, by taxes, and by hunger and idleness due to the devastation of the fields. The consuls on taking command of the army in Apulia had altogether 70,000 foot and 6000 horse, and they encamped near a village called Cannae. Hannibal’s camp was near by. Hannibal, who was always ready to fight and impatient of idleness, was especially so now because he was troubled lest his supplies should fail, for which reason he continually offered battle. He feared