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Ancient Greek Page · Branch 19 of 28
Alcibiades II · 147c–148a
Ancient Greek
p. 32οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὅμηρόν γε τὸν θειότατόν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς—ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ 147d μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δέ, φησί, πάντα ἠπίστατο—ἀλλ’ αἰνίττεται οἶμαι παράγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἠπίστατο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι· γίγνεται οὖν συντεθὲν ἔξω μὲν τοῦ μέτρου, ἔστι δ’ ὅ γε βούλεται, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακὸν δ’ ἦν ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῷ κακὸν τὸ πολλὰ εἰδέναι, φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, εἴπερ γε πιστεύειν δεῖ τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις.
147eΑΛ. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἦ χαλεπῶς γ’ ἂν ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύσαιμι λόγοις, εἴπερ μηδὲ τούτοις.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ.
ΑΛ. Πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ φέρε πρὸς Διός—ὁρᾷς γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅση τε καὶ οἵα, ταύτης δὲ καὶ σύ μοι δοκεῖς κεκοινωνηκέναι· μεταβαλλόμενός γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν παύῃ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἂν μάλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ 148a καὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν—εἰ οὖν σοί γ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος ἐρωτήσειε, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι ἐκείνων τι γενέσθαι ὧνπερ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλέγετο, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ σοι ἐπιτρέψειεν εὔξασθαι, τί ποτ’ ἂν οἴει ἢ τῶν παρ’ ἐκείνου διδομένων λαμβάνων ἢ αὐτὸς εὐξάμενος γενέσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν;
ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ μάργον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι,
Alcibiades II
p. 33For surely you do not think that Homer, the most divine and wisest of poets, was ignorant that it was impossible to know badly—for it is he who says that Margites 147d knew many things, but badly, he says, knew them all—but he is speaking in riddles, I think, putting badly in place of bad, and knew in place of to know. Put together, then, it falls outside the meter, but it is what he means: that he knew many works, but it was bad for him to know them all. It is clear, then, that if knowing many things was bad for him, he was in fact a sorry fellow, if indeed we must trust the arguments already stated.
Alc. 147e Well, I think so, Socrates; truly, I would hardly trust any other arguments, if not even these.
Soc. And you are right to think so.
Alc. It seems the other way to me again.1
Soc. But come, by Zeus—for surely you see the perplexity, how great it is and of what kind, and you too seem to me to have had a share in it: at any rate, shifting up and down, you never stop at all, but whatever you think most firmly, that too you seem to have slipped out of again 148a and no longer to think the same—if, then, even now the god to whom you are in fact on your way were to appear to you and ask you, before you prayed for anything at all, whether it would suffice you that one of those things should come about that were spoken of at the beginning, or else were to leave it to you yourself to pray, how on earth do you think you would hit the right mark, either by taking what he gives or by praying yourself for something to come about?
Alc. But by the gods, Socrates, I would have nothing to say to you offhand like this; but it seems to me a madcap thing,2
Socrates
Reading Alcibiades II · Alcibiades II · 147c–148a
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates and Alcibiades examine prayer, ignorance, and the knowledge of what is best. Their inquiry asks whether receiving what we desire can harm us when we do not know what is good. This complete revised edition presents the dialogue, 138a–151c, across twenty-one Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and translator’s notes. The dialogue is transmitted among Plato’s works; its authorship remains disputed.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901), in a later Oxford impression printed by John Johnson and published by Humphrey Milford. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the supplied printed pages. Burnet’s lineation, verse quotations, and critical apparatus are retained. The supplied PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared and revised this independent English translation directly from the Greek, preserving the argument’s distinctions and the vocabulary of prayer and ritual. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it. Translator’s notes accompany their passages. The introduction and Key Words of the Dialogue precede the text; the Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary of Key Terms, and Note on this Edition follow it. Introductory and concluding matter reflows for the screen.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, and reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The independent English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions.