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Alcibiades II

Ancient Greek with an independent English translation.

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Alcibiades IIAlcibiades II · 139a–139d

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Alcibiades II · 139a–139d

Ancient Greek

p. 6

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε 139b φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη ἄρ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι.

ΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;

ΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι;

ΑΛ. Ὡμολόγησα γάρ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;

ΑΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

139cΣΩ. Ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς;

ΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσούτων 139d μαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι; ἀλλὰ ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτ’ ἔχει.

ΑΛ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτ’ ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην.

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Alcibiades II

p. 7

Soc. Whether you think it possible to be either intelligent or unintelligent, or whether there is some third condition between them, which makes a man 139b neither intelligent nor unintelligent?1

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Then one must be in one or the other of these conditions.

Alc. I think so.

Soc. Now, do you remember agreeing that madness is the opposite of intelligence?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And also that there is no third condition between them, which makes a man be neither intelligent nor unintelligent?

Alc. Yes, I agreed.

Soc. And surely, how could two things be the opposite of one thing?

Alc. In no way.

Soc. 139c Then it looks as though unintelligence and madness are the same.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. So if we said, Alcibiades, that all the unintelligent are mad, we would be right to say it: for instance, of those your own age, if any are in fact unintelligent, as some are, and of those older still. For come, by Zeus: don’t you think that of those in the city the intelligent are few, while the many, of course, are unintelligent, the very ones you call mad?

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you think, then, that we would go on living as citizens with impunity among so many 139d madmen, and would not long ago have paid the penalty, struck and pelted and all the other things madmen are in the habit of doing? But see, my dear fellow: perhaps this is not so.

Alc. How on earth could it be, then, Socrates? For it looks as though it is not as I thought.

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About This Reading Edition

Socrates and Alcibiades examine prayer, ignorance, and the knowledge of what is best. Their inquiry asks whether receiving what we desire can harm us when we do not know what is good. This complete revised edition presents the dialogue, 138a–151c, across twenty-one Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and translator’s notes. The dialogue is transmitted among Plato’s works; its authorship remains disputed.

Discussion Questions

Historical Text and Translation

The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901), in a later Oxford impression printed by John Johnson and published by Humphrey Milford. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the supplied printed pages. Burnet’s lineation, verse quotations, and critical apparatus are retained. The supplied PDF preserves the complete printed layout.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared and revised this independent English translation directly from the Greek, preserving the argument’s distinctions and the vocabulary of prayer and ritual. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it. Translator’s notes accompany their passages. The introduction and Key Words of the Dialogue precede the text; the Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary of Key Terms, and Note on this Edition follow it. Introductory and concluding matter reflows for the screen.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, and reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The independent English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions.