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Facing Pages · Branch 17 of 28
Alcibiades II · 146b–146e
Ancient Greek
p. 28ΑΛ. Ὀρθῶς μέντοι νὴ Δία.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐδόκει οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν προχείρως μέλλωμεν ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν;
ΑΛ. Ἐδόκει.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κἂν μὲν πράττῃ ἅ τις οἶδεν ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως, καὶ λυσιτελούντως ἡμᾶς ἕξειν 146c καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;
ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γ’ οἶμαι τἀναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτ’ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;
ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡσαύτως σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἄλλως πως;
ΑΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ’ οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἆρ’ οὖν ἔφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δ’ ὀλίγους φρονίμους;
ΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φαμεν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτηκέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλά γε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότας.
146dΑΛ. Φαμὲν γάρ.
ΣΩ. Λυσιτελεῖ ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτ’ εἰδέναι μηδὲν μήτ’ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, εἴπερ γε μᾶλλον προθυμήσονται πράττειν μὲν ταῦτα ἅττ’ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἢ οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι, πράττοντες δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι.
ΑΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτε γ’ ἔφην κινδυνεύειν τό γε τῶν ἄλλων 146e ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό, ἆρ’ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων;
Alcibiades II
p. 29Alc. Rightly indeed, by Zeus.
Soc. Now, did it not seem necessary to us that we must first think we know, or really know, whatever we are readily about to do or say?
Alc. It did.
Soc. Then if one does what he knows or seems to know, and the beneficially accompanies it, we shall be in a profitable state 146c both for the city and for oneself?
Alc. Of course.
Soc. But if, I think, the opposite of these, neither for the city nor for oneself?
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. What, then? Does it still seem the same to you now too, or somehow otherwise?
Alc. No, it is so.
Soc. Did you say, then, that you call the many unintelligent, and the few intelligent?
Alc. I did.
Soc. Then we say again that the many have missed the best, since, I think, they have in most things trusted opinion without sense.
Alc. 146d We do say so.
Soc. Then it profits the many neither to know anything nor to think they know, if indeed they will be more eager to do whatever they know or think they know, and in doing it to be harmed for the most part rather than benefited.
Alc. What you say is most true.
Soc. Do you see, then: when I said that the possession of the other 146e kinds of knowledge, if someone possesses it without the knowledge of the best, looks as though it seldom benefits and for the most part harms the one who has it, was I not really shown to be speaking rightly?
Socrates
Reading Alcibiades II · Alcibiades II · 146b–146e
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates and Alcibiades examine prayer, ignorance, and the knowledge of what is best. Their inquiry asks whether receiving what we desire can harm us when we do not know what is good. This complete revised edition presents the dialogue, 138a–151c, across twenty-one Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and translator’s notes. The dialogue is transmitted among Plato’s works; its authorship remains disputed.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901), in a later Oxford impression printed by John Johnson and published by Humphrey Milford. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the supplied printed pages. Burnet’s lineation, verse quotations, and critical apparatus are retained. The supplied PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared and revised this independent English translation directly from the Greek, preserving the argument’s distinctions and the vocabulary of prayer and ritual. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it. Translator’s notes accompany their passages. The introduction and Key Words of the Dialogue precede the text; the Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary of Key Terms, and Note on this Edition follow it. Introductory and concluding matter reflows for the screen.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, and reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The independent English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions.