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Ancient Greek Page · Branch 12 of 28
Alcibiades II · 143b–143e
Ancient Greek
p. 18ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς 143c λέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν.
ΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν;
ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ’ οὔ;
ΑΛ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις 143d τυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι.
ΑΛ. Εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστ’ οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ. δοκεῖς δ’ ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι;
ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
143eΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα.
ΑΛ. Οὐ μέντοι.
ΣΩ. Κακὸν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον.
ΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;
ΑΛ. Φημί.
ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα
Alcibiades II
p. 19Soc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some man who is in fact wiser than both you and me might say that we do not 143c speak rightly in finding fault with ignorance so at random, unless we were to add that there is ignorance of some things, and for some people in some state, that is a good thing, just as for those others it is a bad thing.
Alc. What do you mean? Is there any thing whatever which it is better for anyone whatever, in any state whatever, to be ignorant of than to know?
Soc. I think so. And you do not?
Alc. No indeed, by Zeus.
Soc. But surely I will not charge you with this either: that you would be willing to have done to your own mother what they say Orestes did, and Alcmaeon, and whoever else 143d has in fact done the same as they.1
Alc. Speak auspiciously, for Zeus’ sake, Socrates!2
Soc. It is not the one who says that you would not be willing to have done these things, Alcibiades, whom you should bid speak auspiciously, but much rather anyone who might say the opposite, since the thing seems to you so very dreadful that it must not even be spoken of so at random. Do you think Orestes, if he had in fact been intelligent and had known what was best for him to do, would have dared to do any of these things?
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. 143e Nor, I think, would anyone else.
Alc. No indeed.
Soc. Then ignorance of the best, and being ignorant of the best, is, as it seems, a bad thing.
Alc. I think so.
Soc. Both for him and for all the rest?
Alc. I say so.
Soc. Then let us look into this further as well: if
Socrates
Reading Alcibiades II · Alcibiades II · 143b–143e
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates and Alcibiades examine prayer, ignorance, and the knowledge of what is best. Their inquiry asks whether receiving what we desire can harm us when we do not know what is good. This complete revised edition presents the dialogue, 138a–151c, across twenty-one Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and translator’s notes. The dialogue is transmitted among Plato’s works; its authorship remains disputed.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901), in a later Oxford impression printed by John Johnson and published by Humphrey Milford. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the supplied printed pages. Burnet’s lineation, verse quotations, and critical apparatus are retained. The supplied PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared and revised this independent English translation directly from the Greek, preserving the argument’s distinctions and the vocabulary of prayer and ritual. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it. Translator’s notes accompany their passages. The introduction and Key Words of the Dialogue precede the text; the Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary of Key Terms, and Note on this Edition follow it. Introductory and concluding matter reflows for the screen.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, and reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The independent English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions.